

**BOKO HARAM'S STRATEGY DECONSTRUCTED: A CASE STUDY
COMPARISON BETWEEN BOKO HARAM AND THE
ALGERIAN NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT**

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

**MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
General Studies**

by

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Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
2015

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE				<i>Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188</i>
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1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 12-06-2015	2. REPORT TYPE Master's Thesis	3. DATES COVERED (From - To) AUG 2014 – JUN 2015		
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Boko Haram's Strategy Deconstructed: A Case Study Comparison Between Boko Haram and the Algerian National Liberation Front			5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
			5b. GRANT NUMBER	
			5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) Major Cortis B. Burgess, USA			5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
			5e. TASK NUMBER	
			5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army Command and General Staff College ATTN: ATZL-SWD-GD Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301			8. PERFORMING ORG REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)			10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
			11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited				
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES				
14. ABSTRACT Since 2009, Boko Haram has waged a campaign of terror in Nigeria that has resulted in over 10,000 fatalities and threatens the security and stability of West Africa. Boko Haram has stated its objective as the creation of an Islamic State in Nigeria governed by a puritanical form of Salafist Islam. This research sought to discover whether Boko Haram could usurp the Nigerian Government's control over Northern Nigeria with their current strategy. By conducting a case study comparison between Boko Haram and a successful insurgency, the Algerian National Liberation Front, it was possible to answer the primary research question. Boko Haram can usurp the Nigerian Government's control over Northern Nigeria; however, it will only occur due to the Nigerian Government's lack of commitment to defeating Boko Haram. With their current strategy, Boko Haram is unable to generate the popular or external support needed to establish a legitimate source of power and influence in Northern Nigeria. Finally, this research identified how Boko Haram could improve their strategy and what the Nigerian Government should do to prevent Boko Haram from establishing control over Northern Nigeria.				
15. SUBJECT TERMS Boko Haram, Nigeria, Insurgency, Strategy, Algeria, National Liberation Front				
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:		17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT (U)	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 110	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT (U)	b. ABSTRACT (U)			c. THIS PAGE (U)

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39.18

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

BOKO HARAM'S STRATEGY DECONSTRUCTED: A CASE STUDY COMPARISON BETWEEN BOKO HARAM AND THE ALGERIAN NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT, by MAJ Cortis B. Burgess, 110 pages.

Since 2009, Boko Haram has waged a campaign of terror in Nigeria that has resulted in over 10,000 fatalities and threatens the security and stability of West Africa. Boko Haram has stated its objective as the creation of an Islamic State in Nigeria governed by a puritanical form of Salafist Islam. This research sought to discover whether Boko Haram could usurp the Nigerian Government's control over Northern Nigeria with their current strategy. By conducting a case study comparison between Boko Haram and a successful insurgency, the Algerian National Liberation Front, it was possible to answer the primary research question. Boko Haram can usurp the Nigerian Government's control over Northern Nigeria; however, it will only occur due to the Nigerian Government's lack of commitment to defeating Boko Haram. With their current strategy, Boko Haram is unable to generate the popular or external support needed to establish a legitimate source of power and influence in Northern Nigeria. Finally, this research identified how Boko Haram could improve their strategy and what the Nigerian Government should do to prevent Boko Haram from establishing control over Northern Nigeria.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This thesis would not have been possible without the support of my research committee, Dr. Timothy Hentschel, Mr. Michael Burke, and LTC Robert Bennett. Their sage wisdom and advice were helpful not just in guiding the direction of this research, but their constant feedback allowed me to identify gaps in my analysis. Thank you gentlemen, for all the times that I asked if I could bend your ear for a few minutes, which often lasted an hour.

Equally, credit is due to the staff and faculty of the US Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC). The instruction offered at CGSC was instrumental in improving my understanding of tactics, strategy, and the behavior of militant organizations. It is my hope that this research proves that I have synthesized the knowledge gained by resident attendance and that it has improved my future potential as an Army officer.

Furthermore, this work would have been impossible if it were not for the countless researchers before me who have attempted to explain why insurgencies occur and how they operate. Whether we like it or not, the US Army must prepare for a future of fighting non-state actors, like insurgents. It is my hope that this research adds to the collective knowledge of how insurgent groups develop and operate, so that the US Army's future counter-insurgency doctrine focuses on prevention, not reaction.

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ACRONYMS

ALN	National Liberation Army
AQ	Core Al Qaeda
AQIM	Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
COIN	Counter-Insurgency
CRUA	Revolutionary Committee for Unity and Action
ENA	African Northern Star
FLN	National Liberation Front
GPRA	Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic
ISWAP	Islamic State's West Africa Province
MTLD	Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Liberties
OS	Secret Organization of the MTLD
UDMA	Democratic Union of the Algerian Manifesto
ULEMA	Association of the Islamic Sharia Law Scholars
UN	United Nations

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

The April 13, 2014 kidnapping of almost 300 Nigerian schoolgirls by a terrorist organization known as Boko Haram, sparked an international social media campaign with numerous celebrities, including America's First Lady, holding signs that read "#Bringbackourgirls." International media outlets surged to report information about the kidnapping and the reactionary social media campaign to release the girls. To many outside of Nigeria and international security circles, this frenzy of information flowing after the kidnapping was likely the first time that they had heard of Boko Haram.

The term Boko Haram loosely translates to 'Western knowledge is forbidden;' however, the name, like many other aspects of the organization such as its objectives, historical development, and links to Al Qaeda remain contested.¹ What is not contested is that this organization is an Islamic extremist group that uses terrorist tactics with little regard for civilian casualties. In the five years prior to April 2014, when Boko Haram's kidnapping of 276 schoolgirls gained international media attention, the group had waged a war in Northern Nigeria which resulted in over 4,000 deaths.²

¹ Jideofor Adibe, "What Do We Really Know About Boko Haram?" in *Boko Haram: Anatomy of Crisis*, ed. Ioannis Mantzikos (Bristol, UK: e-International Relations, 2013), 11, accessed September 11, 2014, www.e-ir.info.

² The Editorial Board, "Dealing with Boko Haram," *New York Times*, May 31, 2014, accessed September 13, 2014, <http://search.proquest.com/>.




Figure 1. Political boundary map of Nigeria

Source: Lib.utexas.edu, “Nigeria Maps,” Perry-Castañeda Map Collection, University of Texas Library Online, accessed October 26, 2014, <http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/nigeria.html>.

Nigeria: History, Demographics, and Significance

The Federal Republic of Nigeria is situated in West Africa along the Gulf of Guinea and shares borders with the countries of Benin, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. At 910,768 square kilometers, Nigeria occupies a landmass roughly twice the size of California.³ Nigeria consists of thirty-six states and 250 ethnic groups. Socio-demographic divisions within the country that persist to this day can be traced to

³ Central Intelligence Agency, “Nigeria,” The World Factbook, accessed April 4, 2015, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ni.html>.

individual kingdoms that created autonomous states as early as the fourteenth century. Four ethnic groups, the Hausa and Fulani in the North, Yoruba in the Southwest, and Igbo in the Southeast, account for sixty-one percent of the Nigerian population; all four are remnants of independent kingdoms established as early as the fourteenth century.⁴

The effects of European colonization, and more importantly the trans-Atlantic slave trade, further divided the individual ethnic populations of North and South Nigeria. While the Northern Hausa dominated states were largely unaffected by the slave trade, the Southern states experienced “dramatic economic and political change.”⁵ The lasting effect of the slave trade economy in Southern Nigeria would be the Western influence that came with it.

Northern Nigeria was further isolated from the South when the Sokoto Caliphate was created which combined all of the ethnic Fulani and Hausa under one Islamic state. The Sultan of Sokoto commanded a vast empire that covered Northern Nigeria and parts of present day Benin, Niger, and Cameroon.⁶ By the end of the nineteenth century, British colonial authorities had subdued the Sokoto Caliphate through military force and created a British protectorate in northern Nigeria.

The British colonial control of Nigeria, until independence was granted in 1960, applied distinct approaches to governing the North compared to the South. In the North,

⁴ Helen Chapin Metz, ed., *Nigeria: A Country Study*, 5th ed. (Washington, DC: G.P.O., 1992), 2.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Jonathan T. Reynolds, “The Politics of History,” *Journal of Asian and African Studies (Brill)* 32, no. 1/2 (June 1997): 51, accessed October 18, 2014, www.web.a.ebscohost.com.

after the British overthrew the Sultan, they allowed the local emirs to maintain their administrative system of governance, creating “native authority.”⁷ The South was however, increasingly secularized by colonial influence, and accepted the western style of government. Presently, Nigerian religious demographics are divided into a Muslim North and Christian South; 50 percent of Nigeria are Muslim and 40 percent are Christian.⁸

Nigeria has the largest economy in Africa, but as of 2010 over 70 percent of the population lived below the poverty line.⁹ This discrepancy between having a large economy with so much of the population living below the poverty line indicates an imbalanced distribution of wealth and political ‘pocket-lining.’ Nigeria is the “thirteenth largest supplier of oil to the global market and the second largest destination for US private investment in Africa.”¹⁰ Insurgent groups can easily rally mass support behind social concerns like an imbalanced distribution of oil revenues and implications of political corruption.

Beginning after independence in 1960, and continuing to present day, several grass-roots militant organizations using different names have conducted attacks on oil infrastructure in the Niger Delta; each time the government has suppressed the groups

⁷ Reynolds, “The Politics of History,” 52.

⁸ Metz, *Nigeria: A Country Study*, 9.

⁹ Central Intelligence Agency, “Nigeria.”

¹⁰ Linda Thomas Greenfield, “Countering the Threat Posed by Boko Haram,” *Hampton Roads International Security Quarterly* (January 2014): 87, accessed September 13, 2014, <http://search.proquest.com/>.

with overwhelming military force.¹¹ The latest militancy was the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), which conducted attacks on Nigerian oil infrastructure from 2006 until 2009. The Nigerian Government sought to counter the MEND by conducting attacks and aerial bombardments on communities associated with the group without regard to civilian casualties. Each attack by government forces only increased the response by the MEND. “Due to the escalation in militancy by May 2009 many oil fields were barely functional.”¹² The MEND movement ended in July 2009 when the Nigerian Government finally agreed to negotiate and offered economic incentives for peace.

Nigeria is “Africa’s second largest troop-contributing country in ten different peace keeping missions in Africa . . . and supplies almost half of the Sahel’s cereal needs.”¹³ Due to the conflict with Boko Haram, Nigerian cereal production has dropped and prices have increased, which has caused significant security issues for countries throughout the Sahel that rely on imported Nigerian cereal.¹⁴ Similarly, the 2006 to 2009 attacks on Nigerian oil infrastructure by the MEND dramatically affected the

¹¹ Elias Courson, “MEND: Political Marginalization, Repression, and Petro-Insurgency in the Niger Delta,” *African Security* 4, no. 1 (January 2011): 26, accessed October 18, 2014, www.web.a.ebscohost.com.

¹² Courson, 37.

¹³ Joseph Siegle, “Boko Haram and the Isolation of Northern Nigeria: Regional and International Implications,” in *Boko Haram: Anatomy of Crisis*, ed. Ioannis Mantzikos (Bristol, UK: e-International Relations, 2013), 88, accessed September 11, 2014, www.e-ir.info.

¹⁴ Ibid.

international oil market, causing the per barrel price of oil to rise sharply.¹⁵ While the Nigerian Government is distracted with fighting Boko Haram, both Nigerian military and economic contributions to regional stability initiatives decreases. This drop in stability would likely result in increased criminal acts and make the entire region vulnerable to militant recruitment.

From colonial rule until present day, Nigeria has never truly coalesced as a nation with equal representation for its many ethnic and religious demographics.¹⁶ Boko Haram is an extension of the ethnic and religious rifts within Nigeria. The group's expressed goal, to restore the Islamic Caliphate in Northern Nigeria would result in increased political and economic isolation of Northern Nigeria. Attacks by Boko Haram have already reduced the estimated annual trade through the Northern economic hub, Kano, by 50 percent, or almost 8 million dollars.¹⁷

The continued expansion of violent extremist groups, like Boko Haram in Nigeria, have the potential to threaten regional security and stability in West Africa. It is therefore necessary to understand how insurgencies like Boko Haram develop and apply strategies to expand their influence. This study seeks to examine in depth Boko Haram's strategy and whether the group's actions indicate an application of an insurgent strategy that can successfully usurp the incumbent Nigerian Government's control over Northern

¹⁵ Courson, 31.

¹⁶ Benjamin Maiangwa, "Killing in the Name of God? Explaining the Boko Haram Phenomenon in Nigeria," *The Journal of Social, Political, and Economic Studies* 38, no. 1 (Spring 2013): 55-79, accessed September 13, 2014, <http://search.proquest.com/>.

¹⁷ Siegle, 86.

Nigeria. By evaluating Boko Haram's strategy this study will also identify ways that Boko Haram could improve their strategy and as a result, it will also provide the Nigerian Government with ways to defeat Boko Haram.

Primary Research Question

Can Boko Haram successfully usurp the Nigerian Government's control over Northern Nigeria?

Secondary Questions

What is Boko Haram's strategy?

How has Boko Haram's strategy evolved?

Do Boko Haram's messages match their actions?

Assumptions

This research assumed that Boko Haram's political objective is the establishment of an independent state in Northern Nigeria, ruled by strict Sharia Law. It was further assumed that the Nigerian Government will not accept the creation of an independent Northern Nigerian State. Additionally, it was assumed that if Boko Haram applies a strategy that results in achieving their objective, then the Nigerian Government's counter-insurgency (COIN) strategy would logically have been unsuccessful. Therefore, in the Boko Haram case, a successful insurgent strategy and a successful COIN strategy are mutually exclusive. While a successful COIN strategy for the Nigerian Government might include negotiation with insurgents and as a result acquiescing to insurgent demands, it was assumed that conceding control of a region or its population to the insurgency would be a counter-insurgent strategic failure. By identifying the successful

aspects of Boko Haram's current strategy this research also exposes the requirements of a successful COIN strategy.

Definitions

Insurgency: For the purpose of this study, the definition of insurgency is applied as defined by the US Department of State:

Insurgency can be defined as ‘the organized use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify, or challenge political control of a region.’ Insurgents seek to subvert or displace the government and completely or partially control the resources and population of a given territory. They do so through the use of force (including guerrilla warfare, terrorism and coercion/intimidation), propaganda, subversion and political mobilization. Insurgents fight government forces only to the extent needed to achieve their political aims: their main effort is not to kill counterinsurgents, but rather to establish a competitive system of control over the population, making it impossible for the government to administer its territory and people. Insurgent activity is therefore designed to weaken government control and legitimacy while increasing insurgent control and influence.¹⁸

Narrative: For the purpose of this study a narrative is defined as “a story or account of events, experiences, or the like, whether true or fictitious,” which organizations like insurgent groups employ to reinforce their identity.¹⁹

Strategy: For the purpose of this study, strategy is defined as the process of achieving objectives (ends) through the purposeful application (ways) of available resources (means) while accounting for risk.²⁰ “The focus of strategy is on how the ends,

¹⁸ US Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, *US Government Counter Insurgency Guide*, January 13, 2009, 9, accessed October 26, 2014, www.state.gov/t/pm/ppa/pmppt.

¹⁹ Dictionary.com, “Narrative,” accessed May 3, 2015, <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/narrative>.

²⁰ Harry R. Yarger, *Strategic Theory for the 21st Century* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2006), 52-60.

ways and means interact synergistically with the strategic environment to produce the desired effect.”²¹ Simply put, strategy is how an organization achieves its goals with their available resources within their unique operating environment. Strategies are therefore unique to the organization and the environment. A successful strategy employed by one organization would not guarantee success for another organization, but a successful strategy could serve as a beneficial model for planning.

Terrorism: For the purpose of this study terrorism is defined as “the use of violent acts to frighten the people in an area as a way of trying to achieve a political goal,” with the addition of the threat of violence as a form of coercive terrorism.²²

²¹ Ibid., 56.

²² Merriam-Webster.com, “Terrorism,” accessed October 27, 2014,
<http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/terrorism>.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Boko Haram Literature

Since 2013, when Boko Haram kidnapped almost 300 schoolgirls from a town in Northern Nigeria and dominated international media headlines, academics across the world have dedicated countless journal articles to analyzing the Boko Haram phenomenon. As an insurgent organization, three factors become key to understanding Boko Haram: the environmental conditions that created the group, the responses by the Nigerian Government, and Boko Haram's strategy. A majority of the literature reviewed focused on those three factors and as a result advocated changes in the Nigerian Government's strategy for defeating Boko Haram. For the record, no articles were found that affirmed the Nigerian Government's strategy or praised the activities of Boko Haram.

E-international Relation's (2013) collection of articles on Boko Haram, *Boko Haram: Anatomy of Crisis*, edited by Ioannis Mantzikos offers the most robust diagnosis of this complex problem set. In his contribution to *Boko Haram: Anatomy of Crisis*, Jideofore Adibe explains that many important aspects of Boko Haram are still being debated; specifically, the origins of the group, how the group radicalized, and what external linkages Boko Haram has to other Sub-Saharan terrorist groups or Al Qaeda.²³ Mr. Adibe does not discuss the Nigerian Government's strategy to defeat Boko Haram,

²³ Jideofor Adibe, "What Do We Really Know about Boko Haram?" in *Boko Haram: Anatomy of Crisis*, ed. Ioannis Mantzikos (Bristol, UK: e-International Relations, 2013), 9-15, accessed September 11, 2014, www.e-ir.info.

likely because the ability for Boko Haram to continue conducting successful attacks is proof that the government's COIN strategy has been unsuccessful.

When examining the environmental conditions that perpetuated the origin of Boko Haram, several articles purport that it is too easy to frame Boko Haram as a religiously driven insurgency. Benjamin Maiangwa's article in *The Journal of Social, Political, and Economic Studies*, provides that Boko Haram is just the latest manifestation of reactions to bad governance in Nigerian history, "disguised by the cloak of religion."²⁴ Maiangwa examines in depth the history of power struggles amongst the various ethnic and religious camps within Nigeria. As recourse to prevent future Boko Harams, Maiangwa calls for action to address failed plurality within the Nigeria and greater political transparency.²⁵ While Maiangwa focuses on addressing the environmental conditions that promote Islamic radicalization against the Nigerian state through political reforms, he overlooks the interests and effects of Islamic extremist organizations external to Nigeria.

Felix Akpan, Okonette Ekanem, and Angela Olofu-Adeoye in their article, "Boko Haram Insurgency and the Counter Terrorism Policy in Nigeria," compare Nigeria's Boko Haram problem to those experienced by other nations facing similar Islamic extremist groups. Along with the necessity for government reform, Akpan, Ekanem, and Olofu-Adeoye recommend that the Nigerian Government reach out to neighboring governments to address border issues. Based on their comparative analysis, insurgents

²⁴ Maiangwa, "Killing in the Name of God?" 55-79.

²⁵ Ibid.

and their external supporters consistently exploit porous borders to cross into target areas and establish camps to launch attacks.²⁶ The authors further recommend that the Nigerian Government should not attempt to negotiate with leaders of Boko Haram, but should instead focus its efforts on engaging the moderate Muslims in Northern Nigeria and coopting their support in the fight against Boko Haram. Akpan and colleagues additionally offer an insight that many of Boko Haram members conduct attacks under the influence of various drugs.²⁷ The connection to drugs is rarely mentioned by other academics on the subject of Boko Haram, but it is invaluable for understanding the organization's modus operandi.

Oluwaseun Bamidele's article "Nigeria's Terrorist Threat: Present Contexts and the Future of Sub Saharan Africa," in the *International Journal on World Peace* (2013) also advocates for a regional strategy to defeat Boko Haram. Bamidele examines specifically the connection between Nigeria's Boko Haram problem and the larger Sub-Saharan Africa Islamic extremist network, as well as its linkages to the global Al Qaeda network. Without a collective regional strategy amongst the various West African countries plagued by Islamic insurgencies, each government's unilateral actions to remedy their own insurgency would equate to a game of whack-a-mole.²⁸ Bamidele

²⁶ Felix Akpan, Okonette Ekanem, and Angela Olofu-Adeoye, "Boko Haram Insurgency and the Counter Terrorism Policy in Nigeria," *Canadian Social Science* 10, no. 2 (2014): 155, accessed September 13, 2014, <http://search.proquest.com/>.

²⁷ Ibid., 152.

²⁸ Oluwaseun Bamidele, "Nigeria's Terrorist Threat: Present Contexts and the Future of Sub Saharan Africa," *International Journal on World Peace* 30, no. 4 (December 2013): 8, accessed September 12, 2014, www.web.a.ebscohost.com.

cautions against an over-simplified analysis of the connection between local insurgencies like Boko Haram and the global Al Qaeda network. Long after a local insurgency affiliates itself with AQ, its actions are still driven by the agenda that originally inspired its militancy.²⁹ In order to develop a more effective strategy to defeat Boko Haram, Bamidele advocates for understanding the local agenda and focusing on addressing the societal conditions that initially inspired militancy, while avoiding the overly-simplified approach of attributing local insurgency to the trans-national agenda of AQ.³⁰ The only deficiency in Bamidele's article is a lack of detail committed to the analysis of Boko Haram's strategy, specifically the group's desired objectives.

“Boko Haram and Security Challenges in Nigeria,” in the *Kuwait Chapter of the Arabian Journal of Business and Management* (July 2014), by Eme Okechukwu Innocent and Tony O. Onyishi provides an examination of how Boko Haram operationalized their political agenda. From the beginning, Boko Haram has seen the government of Nigeria run by ‘false Muslims’ and has consistently strived to “create a theocratic state ruled by Sharia Law.”³¹ Innocent and Onyishi further explained how a history of harsh tactics by the police, and the extra-judicial killing of Boko Haram’s founder Mohammed Yusuf by Nigerian police, led to a reciprocal escalation in the attacks conducted by Boko Haram.³²

²⁹ Ibid., 20.

³⁰ Ibid., 27.

³¹ Eme Okechukwu Innocent and Tony O. Onyishi, “Boko Haram and Security Challenges in Nigeria,” *Kuwait Chapter of the Arabian Journal of Business and Management Review* 3, no. 11 (July 2014): 16, accessed September 13, 2014, <http://search.proquest.com/>.

³² Ibid., 1-18.

This article also provides insight into Boko Haram’s use of coercion and violence to silence dissenting moderate Muslim opposition in Northern Nigeria.

“The Popular Discourses of Salafi Radicalism and Salafi Counter-Radicalism in Nigeria: A Case Study of Boko Haram,” published in the *Journal of Religion in Africa* (May 2012), also exposes the rift between moderate Muslims and Boko Haram in Northern Nigeria. During the early stages of Boko Haram’s radicalization, both Boko Haram’s leader, Mohammed Yusuf, and the dominant non-radical cleric, Sheik Jafar Adam, agreed that all good Muslims should challenge the authority of a secular government; however, they disagreed on how.³³ Yusuf saw violence as the only way to change the government.³⁴ Yusuf eventually had Sheik Adam assassinated and thus eliminated the competing moderate Islamic dialogue.³⁵ This article corroborates the assertion that Boko Haram members are more interested in power and see Islam as a way to achieve it.

Jacob Zenn’s article “Nigerian Al-Qaedaism,” in *Current Trends in Islamist Ideology* (March 2014) also examines the ideological conflict between Boko Haram’s actions and moderate Muslims. Boko Haram’s willingness to kill Muslims in Northern Nigeria creates tensions between both Boko Haram and moderate Muslims, and amongst

³³ “The Popular Discourses of Salafi Radicalism and Salafi Counter-Radicalism in Nigeria: A Case Study of Boko Haram,” *Journal of Religion in Africa* 42, no. 2 (May 2012): 137, accessed September 12, 2014, www.web.a.ebscohost.com.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Innocent and Onyishi, 8.

less radicalized members of Boko Haram.³⁶ Zenn purports that the harsh tactics of Boko Haram have been counter to any goal of gaining popular support and the Nigerian Government would be wise to exploit this friction.

Major Chukwoma O. Ani of the Nigerian Army in his Masters of Military Art and Science thesis published at the US Army Command and General Staff College focuses on Boko Haram and makes recommendations for changes in the Nigerian Government's strategy to defeat Boko Haram. Major Ani advocated for increased use of inform and influence activities to complement current direct approaches to counter Boko Haram. He postulated that through indirect inform and influence activities the Nigerian Government can neutralize the Boko Haram threat.³⁷ While Major Ani established the relevance of employing an indirect approach to neutralize Boko Haram, he notes the need for additional research to examine how the military will be used to facilitate inform and influence activities, and how indirect will be integrated with direct approaches.

As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, there are a countless number of articles that examine the existence of Boko Haram. The literature selected for review were those that offered the most insight and context necessary to understand the environmental conditions which created Boko Haram, the responses by the Nigerian Government, and Boko Haram's strategy. Through a review of the literature, it is clear

³⁶ Jacob Zenn, "Nigerian Al-Qaedaism," *Current Trends in Islamist Ideology* 16, (March 2014): 99-118, accessed September 13, 2014, <http://search.proquest.com/>.

³⁷ Chukwoma Ani, "Combating Terrorism: A Case Study of Nigeria Against Boko Haram Terrorist Group" (Master's thesis, US Army Command and General Staff College, 2014), 93, accessed October 17, 2014, <http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/singleitem/collection/p4013coll2/id/3200/rec/2>.

that the primary research question of this study, can Boko Haram successfully usurp the Nigerian Government's control over Northern Nigeria, remains to be answered. The literature reviewed does however substantially help answer the secondary questions, what is Boko Haram's Strategy, how has Boko Haram's strategy evolved, and do Boko Haram's messages match their actions.

Algerian War Literature

The Algerian War, which lasted from 1954 until 1962, provides a historical example of the social, political, and strategy aspects of a successful insurgency. The literature selected for review were those that provided detailed accounts of both the French and Algerian National Liberation Front's (FLN) strategy and tactics. Collectively the literature provides insight into the importance of controlling the population as an aspect of insurgent and COIN strategy. Specifically, the literature examines the impact of social identity and socio-political forces such as Islam and Nationalism on the Algerian insurgents' strategy. Within the fight for Algerian national identity, the literature exposes how the tactics of terrorism and torture became an unfortunate side effect of attempts to control the population. Finally, all of the literature supports the argument that the Algerian National Liberation Army (ALN) lost the guerilla war in Algeria to the French Military, but the over-arching FLN won Algerian independence by internationalizing France's Algeria problem.

Michael K. Clark's *Algeria in Turmoil* (1959) was published before the FLN achieved their objective of independence. Clark's book is particularly insightful because it serves as a reflection on events during the Algerian War and seeks to answer the question of why it began. As a neutral observer to the events, Clark does not excuse the

actions of either the French or the FLN during the war. Overall Clark points to the French's inability to assimilate the Algerian Muslim community as the central reason that the war occurred. Clark also notes that as a change agent, the concept of Arab nationalism is shortsighted. Many who supported the Algerian nationalist cause did so with a strong desire to restore the traditions of Islamic society within an increasingly secular world.³⁸ Altogether, Clark points to the Algerian War as a sign of things to come as predominately-Islamic cultures find it difficult to assimilate into a modern era dominated by secular government structures.

In his doctorate monograph *The Algerian Guerilla Campaign* submitted to the University of Reading in 1990, Dr. Abder-Rahmane Derradji adds to the understanding of Islam as it pertained to the Algerian War. Dr. Derradji clarifies that while Islam had been a necessary component of mobilizing popular support for the nationalist cause, after the initial stage of the war in 1956, it was clear that the FLN did not seek to establish an Islamic state; this was also evidenced by a lack of Muslim scholars in the FLN's senior leadership.³⁹

Dr. Derradji also provided a detailed explanation of how Communism facilitated a popular revolution in a country dominated by Muslims. The Algerian nationalists drew inspiration from the communist revolutionary model, but incorporated Islamic principles

³⁸ Michael K. Clark, *Algeria in Turmoil* (New York City: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959), 443.

³⁹ Abder-Rahmane Derradji, *The Algerian Guerrilla Campaign* (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 1997), 247.

into the identity of their nationalist cause.⁴⁰ Dr. Derradji reinforces his argument by comparing the FLN's strategy and tactics to those of the Chinese, Vietnamese, and Latin American communist guerilla models. Dr. Derradji provides evidence that the tactic, which most influenced the FLN's success, was 'pragmatism;' had the FLN clung to a communist revolutionary model they would have alienated the Muslim population.⁴¹ As a matter of hindsight, it can further be garnered from Dr. Derradji's analysis that the Muslim population might have been unhappy to find that their war for independence, which rested on Islamic principles, did not establish an Islamic Algerian state.

Like Dr. Derradji, several authors have offered explanations and analysis of the evolution in the FLN's strategy and tactics. Heggoy (1972) and O'Ballance (1967) both explore the effects of colonial grievances amongst the Algerian Muslims and the development of an Algerian nationalist identity. Horne (1977) along with Heggoy (1972) and O'Ballance (1967) document the causal relationship between changes in the French military's and FLN's tactics; specifically noting that changes in one, directly resulted in changes in the other. Most notable is that while the French COIN strategy was more adaptive, both the FLN and the French suffered from disagreements over tactics.⁴² Heggoy (1972) and O'Ballance (1967) offer a degree of analysis that helps the reader understand the strategic and tactical decisions of both the French and FLN; however, Horne (1977) provides additional details without asserting his opinions on the decisions

⁴⁰ Ibid., 242.

⁴¹ Ibid., 249.

⁴² Edgar O'Ballance, *The Algerian Insurrection, 1954-62* (London: Faber, 1967), 220.

made. Horne's approach allows the reader to develop their own conclusions about the relative impact of each belligerent's actions on the success or failure of their strategy.

As a participant to the Algerian War, serving in the French Army, David Galula's *Pacification in Algeria* (2006) provides the most insightful analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the French COIN, or pacification strategy. Based on his participation in the war, Galula explains what a successful French COIN strategy should have been. Contrary to the opinions of other authors, who have offered analysis of the Algerian War, Galula explains that due to the failed French COIN strategy there were large segments of the native Algerian population that had no choice but to support the FLN.

Surprisingly, Galula credits the FLN with winning the psychological aspects of controlling the population.⁴³ He does not attribute the FLN's success to their strategy as much as the French Government's inability to commit to winning the campaign and the French military's institutionalized conventional tactics that retarded its ability to be adaptive.⁴⁴ While the majority of Galula's accounts of the Algerian War read like journal entries, he applies his individual lessons learned to provide a well-supported guide for defeating future popular insurgencies.

Gil Merom adds to the understanding of the French Government's lack of commitment in his contribution to *Armed Forces and Society*, "A 'Grand Design?' Charles de Gaulle and the End of the Algerian War." Much of the literature on the Algerian War faults the French Government, not the French military for losing the

⁴³ David Galula, *Pacification in Algeria, 1956-1958* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2006), 244.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 17.

Algerian War. Gil Merom specifically examines President Charles de Gaulle's purported "grand design strategy" for resolving the Algeria problem.⁴⁵ Many including De Gaulle believed that he had preplanned a withdrawal with honor strategy for ending the Algerian War before he became president of France in 1958.⁴⁶ The reality as Merom explains is that De Gaulle, like many French presidents before him, reacted to political pressure internationally, from partisans within France, and the unwillingness of the FLN to negotiate.⁴⁷ The importance of government commitment in relation to countering an insurgency provides a critical vulnerability for their strategy and a fundamental advantage of the insurgents who can degrade the government's commitment in the absence of direct military engagement.

Again, all of the literature confirms that the FLN won the war for independence not through military engagement with the French Army, or guerilla warfare; instead, the Algerian War was won through internationalization of the conflict. Additionally, all of the authors attributed the conflict to the nature of the international system following World War II and the beginning of the Cold War. Matthew Connelly's article "Rethinking the Cold War and Decolonization: The Grand Strategy of the Algerian War for Independence," (2001) which he later adapted into the book, *A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria's Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold War Era*

⁴⁵ Gil Merom, "A Grand Design? Charles de Gaulle and the End of the Algerian War," *Armed Forces and Society* 25, no. 2 (Winter 1999): 267, accessed February 5, 2015, www.web.a.ebscohost.com.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 282.

(2002) both provide context for the Algerian War. Specifically, Connelly explains how anti-colonialist movements like those that prompted the Algerian War were a symptom of evolving international systems.

Connelly also describes how the FLN leveraged Cold War animosities between the East and the West to court potential supporters for their cause to include European nations, the US, China, and Russia. While the ALN was fighting the ground war with French forces in Algeria, the FLN sent diplomats around the world to establish diplomatic liaisons and garner support.⁴⁸ The FLN international diplomatic campaign was so effective at defeating the French Government's right to govern Algeria that by 1958, a self-declared Algerian Government, which did not hold any actual sovereign territory, achieved diplomatic recognition.⁴⁹ Connelly's explanation of the significance that international recognition had for the Algerian nationalist cause confirms David Galula's estimate that the FLN held an advantage over the French in the psychological domain.

Lizabeth Zack (2002) provides additional analysis on the importance of political identification within the Algerian War. When the war began, there was not a clear distinction over who was French and who was Algerian.⁵⁰ Zack examined the evolution

⁴⁸ Matthew Connelly, "Rethinking the Cold War and Decolonization: The Grand Strategy of the Algerian War for Independence," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 33 (2001): 227, accessed January 10, 2015, <http://search.proquest.com/>.

⁴⁹ Ibid., 222.

⁵⁰ Lizabeth Zack, "Who Fought the Algerian War? Political Identity and Conflict in French-Ruled Algeria," *International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society* 16, no. 1 (September 2002): 56, accessed February 5, 2015, www.web.a.ebscohost.com.

of narratives as they applied to identities within the Algerian War. Zack specifically discovers that as the Algerian War progressed, all of the various societal demographics within Algeria were either forced to identify with the French status quo, or the future independent Algerian State.⁵¹ Branche (2007) similarly examines the importance of identity and the resulting justifications for terrorism and torture by both belligerents as it comported with their narratives during the conflict.

Collectively the literature reviewed fosters a thorough understanding, not just of how the FLN defeated the French, but how seemingly incongruent socio-political ideologies such as Communism, Nationalism, and Islam, facilitated a popular insurgency. Many of the authors, sometimes indirectly, doubted the efficacy of the future Algerian state, vis-à-vis the employment of terrorist tactics and manipulating the psychological identity of the native Algerian population. Based on the literature, the FLN's success was not gained through guerilla warfare, but a pragmatic application of diplomacy on the international stage. It can further be argued that the war for Algeria was won and lost outside the country of Algeria. None of the literature proposes that the Algerian problem could have been solved without violent conflict within Algeria; however, it can be asserted that based on the literature the psychological aspects of the Algerian war will have lasting negative implications for the future of Algeria's national identity.

⁵¹ Ibid., 61.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Primary Research Question

Can Boko Haram successfully usurp the Nigerian Government's control over Northern Nigeria?

Secondary Questions

What is Boko Haram's strategy?

How has Boko Haram's strategy evolved?

Do Boko Haram's messages match their actions?

Research Method and Design

This study will consist of two phases of data collection and analysis, the information obtained from both phases will be used for a case study comparison. Phase one will be a case study of the Algerian Revolution 1954-1962, commonly referred to as the Algerian War, an Islamic-based popular insurgency that successfully usurped its incumbent government.⁵² The second phase will be an examination of Boko Haram, based on information derived from phase one, the Algerian Revolution case study. The results from both phases will be compared to answer the primary research question and prepare the final findings and conclusions chapter.

⁵² "Insurgencies Rarely Win and Iraq Won't be Any Different (Maybe)," Foreign Policy, January 14, 2014, accessed October 29, 2014, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2007/01/14/insurgencies_rarely_win_ndash_and_iraq_wont_be_any_different_maybe.

To begin the Algerian case study, first it is important to establish salient parameters for comparing the similarities and dissimilarities of individual insurgent strategies. Foremost, according to the US Department of State's definition of an insurgency, the ultimate objective or desired end state of an insurgent strategy would be to "seize, nullify or challenge the political control of a region."⁵³ Based on this definition, it is assumed that all insurgent strategies would share a common desired end state; therefore, the key parameter for analyzing a successful insurgent strategy will be how the insurgent group leveraged resources to defeat the incumbent government's control over a region.

Inherent to the definition of an insurgency, the incumbent government and its security forces would have a significant political and materiel advantage over the insurgents within the contested region. To overcome their disadvantage, insurgent groups develop strategies that leverage two key resources popular and external support. In his book, *From Revolution to Apocalypse: Insurgency and Terrorism*, Bard E. O'Neill explains that popular support provides freedom of movement to the insurgents while restricting the government's ability to "control and subdue" the insurgents.⁵⁴ Similarly, O'Neill explains that insurgent groups can offset the government's political and materiel advantage by seeking external assistance or support.⁵⁵ It is important to note that an insurgency has the capacity to overcome the incumbent government's size, political, and

⁵³ US Department of State, *US Government Counter Insurgency Guide*, 9.

⁵⁴ Bard E. O'Neill, *Insurgency and Terrorism* (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2005), 94.

⁵⁵ Ibid., 139.

military strength, with minimal popular support, in such cases the insurgents must rely on external support.⁵⁶ How an insurgent strategy establishes and leverages popular, as well as external, support is therefore a significant criterion for comparing insurgencies.

Another key aspect of insurgent strategies is their organizational structure, particularly how elements of an insurgent organization are combined synergistically to achieve a desired effect. O'Neill notes that disunity can degrade popular and external support, but more importantly, it can undercut the insurgents' entire strategy.⁵⁷ Similarly, Daniel Byman explains that one of the key steps a "would-be insurgency," or "proto-insurgency," should take to become a "full-blown insurgency" is to defeat rivals.⁵⁸ It can be expected that within a state or region that is under threat of insurgency, there would be multiple insurgent factions, all working to defeat the government in their own way. A successful insurgent group would have to account for and develop a method to ameliorate the threat of competing factions and internal fracture.

O'Neill lists two additional criteria for evaluating insurgent strategies, the environment and the government's COIN response.⁵⁹ Specifically O'Neill explains that knowledge of the human and physical environment, and how insurgent strategies account

⁵⁶ Ibid., 139.

⁵⁷ Ibid., 125-127.

⁵⁸ Daniel Byman, "Understanding Proto-Insurgencies," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 31, no. 2 (April 2008): 165, accessed January 10, 2015, <http://search.proquest.com/>.

⁵⁹ O'Neill, 71.

for characteristics of the environment, can be traced to insurgent success or failure.⁶⁰ As a product of the environment, insurgents' knowledge of environmental conditions results in their ability to "champion a cause" that results in popular or external support.⁶¹ Therefore it is assessed that an examination of whether and how an insurgent strategy establishes popular or external support would illuminate the specific aspects of the environment that are most important for insurgent success.

Logically for an insurgent strategy to succeed, it must be as a result of the incumbent government's failed COIN strategy and vice versa. Due to the mutually exclusive nature of the relationship between insurgent and counter-insurgent success, it was assumed that a thorough examination of a successful insurgent strategy would expose the most salient aspects of the failed COIN strategy. Therefore identifying and evaluating successful insurgent strategies against the factors that resulted in a marked insurgent advantage would provide insight as to how the government's COIN strategy could have been revised to defeat the insurgents.

Finally, the insurgent groups' application of propaganda and terrorism will be especially prescient when comparing insurgent models. Insurgent groups can employ propaganda and terrorist attacks to influence a target audience in support of a political objective.⁶² Through propaganda and terrorism, insurgent groups can increase their levels of popular support, external support, and enforce unity within their organizational

⁶⁰ Ibid., 71.

⁶¹ Byman, 183.

⁶² O'Neill, 33.

structures; however, indiscriminate terrorism by an insurgent group could have negative consequences, such as the loss of support and increased disunity. A key factor for comparing insurgent strategies therefore will be knowing when and how propaganda and terrorism were used, as well as why, and who the target audience was.

Based on the assessment of the key insurgent strategy characteristics, the following questions will be used to evaluate both case studies:

1. How did the insurgents establish and leverage popular support?
2. How did the insurgents establish and leverage external support?
3. How did the insurgents develop unity?
4. How and why was propaganda and terrorism used, and who was the target audience?

Data Collection, Limitations, Delimitations, and Scope

The sources for data collection in both phases will consist of academic journals and books that provided details regarding the history and activities of both insurgent groups. In phase two, it will also be necessary to examine Boko Haram's online video postings to popular sites such as www.youtube.com. Video postings on www.youtube.com will be useful as a data source to examine Boko Haram's use of video propaganda. Since the Algerian War ended in 1962, there are unlikely any relevant videos online to examine.

Data collection was limited to second-hand sources because access to first-hand sources, or participatory observation, was difficult or impossible. Additionally, because Boko Haram is still an active insurgency, data collected for this research was limited to events involving the group prior to January 2015. The purpose of this study was not to

supplant existing insurgent theories, instead it offers context through examination of a particular insurgency, Boko Haram. This study will focus on the insurgent strategy used by Boko Haram by comparing their strategy to a successful Islamic popular insurgency in Algeria to answer the primary research question and will not examine all insurgent tactics or strategy.

Additionally, this research has been limited to an examination of the aspects of insurgent strategies and not COIN strategies. It has been concluded that due to the opposing relationship between insurgent and counter-insurgent success that identifying a successful insurgent strategy would elucidate the requirements for a successful COIN strategy. As it pertains to Boko Haram, by understanding Boko Haram's insurgent strategy and what aspects of that strategy should change to achieve success, this research also exposed how the Nigerian Government's COIN strategy could be altered to prevent Boko Haram's success. Developing a recommended COIN strategy for the Nigerian Government was beyond the scope of this research.

Threats to Validity

It was discovered during the literature review that a majority of academic journal articles written about Boko Haram advocated for changes in the Nigerian Government's strategy to defeat Boko Haram. It was assumed that there would be few if any academic articles that advocate for Boko Haram to defeat the Nigerian Government. Nigeria has a history of social conflict along ethnic and religious lines, many of these conflicts continue to result in criminal and militant activities. It is possible that criminal and militant activities by other organizations in Nigeria could be falsely attributed to Boko Haram.

Also, data collected regarding Boko Haram in public forums may have been sensationalized for political agendas and increased media attention.

Control Measures

The researcher has no political agenda; furthermore, this research was designed to inform not advocate for change. Additionally, this research was focused on the strategy of the insurgents and did not judge the merits of their objectives or desired effects. Data sources that were not peer-reviewed were selected sparingly; when they were chosen, the researcher took into account the source's likely agenda and motivations. It was difficult to avoid false attribution of criminal and militant activities in Nigeria to Boko Haram. The researcher attempted to control false attribution by confirming Boko Haram activities through multiple sources.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Phase One: Algerian War Case Study




Figure 2. Map of Algeria

Source: Lib.utexas.edu, “Algeria Map,” Perry-Castañeda Map Collection, University of Texas Library Online, last modified January 27, 2015, accessed February 1, 2015, <http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/africa/algeria>.

The war for Algerian independence is unique compared to other revolutions for a number of reasons. First, the Algerian War was both an Islamic and nationalist struggle against a secular colonial authority, the French. Next, it is important to note that the National Liberation Front’s (FLN) leadership had only a limited strategy when they began the war for independence. Unlike the campaigns of guerilla warfare led by Che

Guevara or Mao, the FLN's Algerian War did not follow a set theory.⁶³ The guerilla forces within Algeria that became the National Liberation Army (ALN), and their supporters, were already waging a protracted insurgency to degrade the French colonial authority's control over Algeria's future. One of the many decisive victories that the FLN leadership can be credited with was corralling all of the various nationalist factions within Algeria into one organization.

Throughout the war, the FLN simultaneously leveraged secular ideologies, such as Nationalism, anti-colonialism, Democracy, Communism, and the religion of Islam to strengthen their cause. A recipe of propaganda, with different themes directed at different audiences, brought the pressure of Cold War animosities and the unifying strength of Islam against the French, both inside Algeria and on the international stage. Despite the French Forces of Order's COIN campaign, and its arguable effectiveness, the French Government caved to international pressure and acquiesced to nationalist demands. In the end, the FLN did not win the revolution through a protracted guerilla conflict, or a decisive military coup for authority; instead, the Algerian War was won through international diplomacy.

Background

Algeria had been a French colony for one hundred and twenty-four years when the Algerian War began in 1954.⁶⁴ Not long after the French military captured the key

⁶³ Derradji, 34-35.

⁶⁴ Alf Andrew Heggoy, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Algeria* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1972), 4.

Algerian port cities of Algiers, Bone, and Constantine on July 1830, the French Government began a campaign that gave lands annexed from their native Muslim inhabitants to any European colonist who would settle in Algeria.⁶⁵ After over a century of preferential treatment afforded to the colonists in Algeria, the minority population of European colonists dominated Algerian politics and industry.⁶⁶ As a result of colonization, the majority Muslim, native Algerians had become subjects and not citizens of France. Even the ambitious and educated Muslim Algerians who sought French citizenship were still not granted the same rights as European colonists.⁶⁷ Within the growing sense of disenfranchisement a popular energy towards Algerian independence from French colonial authority began.

World War I can be pointed to as a major turning point in Algeria's colonial history; under the materiel and manpower demands of the Great War, many native Algerians were drafted into the French Army or moved to France for work.⁶⁸ Following World War I, there were over 100,000 native Algerians living in France; this number continued to grow each year until 1929.⁶⁹ Within this diaspora of native Algerians two socio-political ideologies, Communism and Islam, collided and created the catalyst that would eventually shape the concept of Algerian nationalism.

⁶⁵ O'Ballance, *The Algerian Insurrection, 1954-62* (London: Faber, 1967), 22.

⁶⁶ Ibid., 24-25.

⁶⁷ Ibid., 26.

⁶⁸ Heggoy, 5.

⁶⁹ Ibid., 23.

Established in 1926 in Paris, the North African Star (ENA or Etoile Nord Africaine), incorporated secular ideologies of Communism and Nationalism, learned from French politics, to mobilize a Muslim working-class with the desired political objective of an independent North Africa.⁷⁰ For its part, through the creation of two newspapers that propagated anti-colonialist ideology, the North African Star, despite being aligned with the French Communist Party, increased the popularity of the idea for Algerian independence amongst native Algerians.⁷¹

Between World Wars I and II the ENA broke away from its initial sponsor, the French Communist Party, and began advocating Nationalism, Pan-Arabism, and Islamic ideals.⁷² With its roots in Communism, the ENA had found an audience with the Algerian working class. At the same time within Algeria, the Association of the Ulama was recruiting a growing number of followers under a banner of Islamic reforms as a means to restore the Algerians ethnic identity.⁷³ Ulama clerics wanted to “make out of Algerian Muslims, particularly the youth, the workers, the peasants, the students, and the men on the streets, good Muslims committed to Islam and country . . . many of these followers would thereafter become Mujahedeen.”⁷⁴

⁷⁰ Ibid., 23.

⁷¹ Derradji, 72-73.

⁷² O’Ballance, 30.

⁷³ Derradji, 76.

⁷⁴ Ibid., 78.

The remaining demographic within the native Algerian population, that would become a necessary ingredient in a successful insurgency, was the educated, upper-middle class, Algerian elites. Until 1940, the man who would years later become the first president of Algeria, Ferhat Abbas, led an assimilationist camp of moderate, educated, political elites that sought equal rights and French citizenship.⁷⁵ Ferhat Abbas and the moderate Muslim Algerian politicians' campaign for integration was rejected by both the Ulama and the more-revolution oriented nationalists that had been inspired by the ENA.⁷⁶ Lacking the political strength of popular support from the native Algerian population, Ferhat Abbas was unable to continue his push for assimilation and transitioned to an anti-colonialist agenda.⁷⁷

By 1946 two significant Algerian nationalist political parties emerged, the Democratic Union of the Algerian Manifesto (UDMA) led by Ferhat Abbas pursuing a secular vision of an Independent Algeria, and the Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Liberties (MTLD) led by the recently released political prisoner and former head of the ENA, Messali Hadji.⁷⁸ In December 1947, the French Government approved a new constitution for Algeria that "proclaimed equality to all French citizens in the country."⁷⁹ With equal rights, Algerians who had achieved French citizenship could run

⁷⁵ Ibid., 79.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ O'Ballance, 31.

⁷⁸ Michael K. Clark, *Algeria in Turmoil* (New York City: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959), 42.

⁷⁹ Derradji, 84.

for office and had the same ability to control Algerian affairs as French colonists. This reform was short lived, as before the elections French colonists had stuffed ballot boxes, polling stations were closed, and thirty-two of the fifty-nine nationalist candidates of the MTLD were arrested by colonial authorities.⁸⁰ The implications of electoral fraud and election rigging in favor of French colonists increased Algerian popular support for the “hardline” MTLD nationalist camp; additionally, elements within the MTLD grew impatient of waiting for independence through politics and sought out an alternative through violence.⁸¹

Without the approval of Messali Hadji, or the leadership of the MTLD, a splinter organization formed within the MTLD under the leadership of Hocine Ait Ahmed.⁸² Ait Ahmed’s special organization (OS) recruited nationalists who would conduct paramilitary style attacks as an alternative to the slower political process.⁸³ On March 18, 1950, a member of the OS turned on the organization, likely due to French or MTLD influence, and provided information that led to the capture of over 400 members of the OS in a series of raids by French police.⁸⁴ Former members of the OS eventually formed the core nucleus of Algerian revolutionaries that became the National Liberation Front

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Heggoy, 31.

⁸² Ibid., 32.

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ Derradj, 97.

(FLN) and its National Liberation Army (ALN) who would later win independence for Algeria.⁸⁵

How did the Insurgents Establish and Leverage Popular Support?

To the credit of FLN leadership, when the decision was made to begin an armed insurrection they did so without mass popular support.⁸⁶ In short order the insurgents would need to coalesce a majority of the demographics of Algerian nationalists behind their cause or risk early defeat by the French colonial security forces. In fact, when the Algerian War began on November 1, 1954, the armed guerilla networks that had been formed into the ALN did not have a commonly agreed on or espoused ideology beyond French expulsion and independence for Algeria.⁸⁷ The FLN and the ALN were liberators, but more importantly they were Algerians before all else.

Following the initiation of the Algerian War, the FLN and ALN appeals for popular support went out in two mediums, radio broadcast and handbills. Through Cairo Radio, and handbills scattered throughout Algeria, the FLN appealed to the “Algerian patriots of every social position and of all parties,” declaring that the “National Liberation Front is your front, and its victory is yours.”⁸⁸ The ALN similarly distributed handbills calling the people of Algeria to arms in support of the ALN. This call to arms declared

⁸⁵ Heggoy, 50.

⁸⁶ O’Ballance, 62.

⁸⁷ Derradji, 100.

⁸⁸ Alistair Horne, *A Savage War Of Peace* (New York: Viking Press, 1978), 95.

that to “take no interest in the struggle is a crime,” and that “you must give aid, comfort, and protection, to the forces of liberation.”⁸⁹

The most insightful aspects of the FLN and ALN calls for support is the use of secular and religious terminology, as if designed to ensure a wider appeal. One of the FLN’s listed goals within this address was “the restoration of the Algerian state, sovereign, democratic, and social, within the framework of the principles of Islam.”⁹⁰ Had the FLN advocated for creating an Islamic state and the need to establish Sharia Law, they would have ostracized the more secular segments of the Algerian population, which included a preponderance of the Algerian political institutions. From its inception, the FLN and ALN would need all the help they could get, by not pushing any one ideology and risk isolating potential supporters; they truly began with a politically correct call for support.

Unfortunately for the FLN and ALN, beginning an armed conflict and distributing propaganda declaring their nationalist goals, and expecting Muslims to join their cause, did not immediately result in mass public support. The first couple of months of the war required ALN members to apply terrorist tactics; support from the Muslim masses was often only “obtained at pistol-point.”⁹¹ When it became clear that the ALN guerillas had not only survived early defeat, but also that they were expanding their zones of control,

⁸⁹ Clark, 111.

⁹⁰ Horne, 95.

⁹¹ O’Ballance, 62.

the bulk of the Muslim population joined sides with the ALN.⁹² By the end of first year of the revolution, the ALN had more Muslim recruits than they needed, but were lacking weapons, ammunition, and supplies.⁹³

With increasing popular support the ALN members received a number of tactical advantages over the French Forces of Order. Without volunteering to fight in the liberation army, Muslim civilians could support the guerilla war by providing valuable intelligence to the ALN.⁹⁴ Arguably the most valuable aspect of popular support for the ALN was the ability to wage a guerilla campaign without being exposed by the civilian populace. Due to the French military advantage, the ALN chose to employ hit and run style guerilla tactics against French officials' houses, cars, and government facilities.⁹⁵ Intelligence provided by an informant network and the security of not being exposed by the civilian populace would have increased the effect of guerilla tactics.

As the Algerian War progressed, the ALN began conducting rural as well as urban warfare. Due to the increased proximity of prying eyes and loose lips found amongst the population bases in the larger cities, popular support would have been increasingly important. ALN fighters and their support networks found refuge in what has been referred to as the “guerilla fortresses” of the predominately-lower class Muslim

⁹² Ibid., 63.

⁹³ Galula, 19.

⁹⁴ O'Ballance, 64.

⁹⁵ Ibid., 205.

kasbahs within cities, such as Algiers.⁹⁶ The kasbahs provided ALN guerillas with safe havens for preparing terrorist style attacks. In addition, from the kasbahs, members of the ALN recruited and trained teenage Muslim girls to emplace bombs throughout the cities.⁹⁷ These young women known as “beach bag carriers” could pass through French roadblocks undetected and were relied on to deliver messages or bombs as needed by the ALN network.⁹⁸

The ALN also established political agents within their ranks to collect taxes and administer civil control over the populations where they had established a presence.⁹⁹ The added advantage of collecting taxes allowed the ALN to provide a salary for their fighters and compensation to their families. Families that lived in the city were paid more and families were paid additional compensation based on the number of children they had.¹⁰⁰ The salaries and compensation were not enough to guarantee that a man would leave his family for extended periods, but “due to widespread unemployment this monetary reward would have attracted some recruits.”¹⁰¹ Because of popular support, the ability to offer monetary incentives other than ethereal rewards such as being a patriot, the ALN was able to recruit and retain a sizeable force of fighters.

⁹⁶ Derradji, 168.

⁹⁷ Horne, 185.

⁹⁸ Derradji, 179.

⁹⁹ Ibid., 119.

¹⁰⁰ Heggyo, 135.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

How did the Insurgents Establish and Leverage External Support?

Prior to the Algerian War, the nine founding members of the FLN-ALN, all former members of the OS, were divided into two groups, one external and one internal. After the 1950 disruption of the OS, four of the founding members, Ahmed Ben Bella, Mohammed Khider, Mohammed Boudiaf, and Hocine Ait Ahmed, found asylum in Cairo and established a sanctuary there to develop plans for armed revolution.¹⁰² Following a military coup in Egypt, which unseated the Egyptian monarchy and created a nationalist government, the external delegates of the FLN won pledges of support for their cause from the new Egyptian Government.¹⁰³

When the FLN-ALN began the war on November 1, 1954, All Saints Day, ALN fighters had a limited arsenal of weapons that had been cached since World War II; therefore, in the absence of weapons supplies from external support, the ALN would be forced to rely exclusively on capturing weapons from the French.¹⁰⁴ By the end of 1955, there were French reports that the ALN began receiving a steady supply of arms shipments from an unidentified sponsor through Libya.¹⁰⁵ Based on a document discovered in December 1955 by the French military in an ALN hideout, written in Arabic and addressed to Colonel Nasser (assumed to be the future president of Egypt)

¹⁰² Ibid., 50.

¹⁰³ Galula, 14-15.

¹⁰⁴ Horne, 84.

¹⁰⁵ Clark, 124.

which resembled a receipt for weapons, it is likely that Egypt had come through on promises to support the FLN-ALN.¹⁰⁶

The ALN guerillas fighting the war on anything French in Algeria, including civilians, were even able to leverage the perceptions of Egyptian military support as a means to incite often exceedingly violent attacks within Algeria. Prior to the Philippeville Massacre on August 20, 1955 in Algeria, where 110 European men, women, and children were killed, mobs of Muslim assailants chanted the phrases “the Egyptian Army has landed” and “America is with us.”¹⁰⁷ This incident highlights this insurgent group’s ability to leverage the perception of external support in a way that incites dehumanized acts of violence, erodes perceptions of security, and will almost ensure a cycle of vengeful reprisals.

External support is not limited to military support, a key aspect of the FLN’s success in winning the Algerian War was diplomatic support. Somehow, from the very first days of the Algerian War, FLN leadership had envisioned internationalization of their cause as a primary means for defeating the French. “Beamed out of Cairo Radio and scattered in pamphlets across Algeria,” the FLN declared their external objectives as “internationalism of the Algerian problem . . . North African unity . . . and active sympathy towards all nations that may support our liberating action.”¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., 125.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., 173-174.

¹⁰⁸ Horne, 95.

The Algeria problem was initially presented to the UN Security Council at a meeting on January 5, 1955 by the Saudi Arabian delegation.¹⁰⁹ The French argued that as a French colony, the revolution in Algeria was not within the jurisdiction of the UN.¹¹⁰ Despite the French intransigence, the UN eventually approved a resolution on February 15, 1957 that called for a “peaceful, democratic, and just solution” to the Algerian problem.¹¹¹ While this may not have been the political thunderbolt that would guarantee independence for Algeria, it set the terms by which the French Government’s ability to contain the Algerian insurrection would be measured.

Similarly, the Bandung conference held April 1955 in Indonesia provided the FLN with an opportunity to leverage Cold War fears to bring international pressure against the French Government.¹¹² At the Bandung conference, members of the FLN joined representatives from neighboring Tunisia and Morocco to form a North African delegation, collectively opposed to French colonialism.¹¹³ By attending the conference, Ait Ahmed, one of the external FLN members living in Cairo, had envisioned leveraging US fears of communist expansion to force US interest in the Algeria problem.¹¹⁴ It would be understandable for an international audience during the height of the Cold War to

¹⁰⁹ Heggoy, 253.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., 255

¹¹¹ Ibid., 256.

¹¹² Connolly, “Rethinking the Cold War and Decolonization,” 224.

¹¹³ Ibid.

¹¹⁴ Ibid., 223.

expect support to the Algerians from the Communist bloc. US perceptions of the Soviet Union hijacking the anti-colonialist movement in North Africa would help the FLN, by forcing American support for the revolution, or at least apply pressure on France to negotiate with the nationalists.

Whether the increasing international pressure brought it about, or as an opportunity to relieve itself of unnecessary burdens, in February 1956 the French Government granted independence to Tunisia and Morocco.¹¹⁵ The French may have hoped this gesture would acquiesce the demands to end colonialism in North Africa, or that the Moroccans and Tunisians would have less of a reason to support the ALN. An unfortunate side effect of this decision was that the French military could no longer pursue ALN fighters across Algerian borders into Morocco or Tunisia without creating an international incident. To rectify their error, after the fact, the French Army “began to fortify the border with electrified fences, minefields, and radar directed artillery.”¹¹⁶ Despite French efforts to interrupt cross-border movement by ALN guerillas, the ALN continued to leverage sanctuaries in Tunisia and Morocco to train, arm, and indoctrinate recruits throughout the war.¹¹⁷

By the summer of 1958, the French military’s COIN campaign, based on lessons learned fighting in Indo-China, specifically Vietnam, was winning the ground war against

¹¹⁵ Ibid., 226.

¹¹⁶ Ibid., 230.

¹¹⁷ Heggy, 138.

the ALN guerilla forces in Algeria.¹¹⁸ Leveraging popular support within Algeria was no longer enough to win independence from France, had the ALN continued to fight a protracted popular conflict without external diplomatic support it is unlikely that the Algerians would have defeated France. On September 19, 1958 in Cairo, the Government Provisoire de la Republique Algerienne (GPRA) was officially established as the de facto government of the independent state of Algeria, with Ferhat Abbas, the former head of the moderate nationalist party, the UDMA, as its provisional president.¹¹⁹ Following the self-declaration of an independent Algerian state, the GPRA sent out diplomatic missions around the world looking for support from any government that would listen. The French assessed that as of June 1960, the GPRA had posted over 177 official representatives to at least thirty-eight countries.¹²⁰ Finally in December 1960, at the UN General Assembly meeting held in New York, a sixty-three to eight majority vote decided that the Algerians had the right to make a decision of “self-determination.”¹²¹ The French Government was finally forced to negotiate terms with the FLN.

How did the Insurgents Develop Unity?

When the Algerian War began, there were two Algerian nationalist camps who would have likely challenged the FLN-ALN’s campaign: the MTLD and the UDMA.¹²²

¹¹⁸ Galula, 64.

¹¹⁹ Connelly, “Rethinking the Cold War and Decolonization,” 232.

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ Ibid., 237.

¹²² Clark, 96-97.

It can be assumed that to be successful the FLN-ALN would have to co-opt members of the other nationalist parties to neutralize their effect on the FLN-ALN's efforts. In order to force France to negotiate only with the FLN, they would have to become the sole voice of the Algerian people. The FLN-ALN, as noted previously, issued a widely disseminated public message calling for all Algerians to support their cause; they did not mention however, that failure to do so would result in violent reprisal.

Immediately following the ALN guerilla attacks that began the Algerian War, many of the French equated the events to ongoing symptoms of "ordinary banditry."¹²³ After the French authorities realized they were facing an Algerian nationalist inspired war for independence, the MTLD was outlawed and arrest warrants were issued for its members.¹²⁴ Thus the French unwittingly assisted the FLN-ALN with a necessary requirement to unify all of the Algerian nationalists under the umbrella of the FLN. Finally, the FLN-ALN coerced the remaining nationalists, most notably the leader of the UDMA, and future president of Algeria, Ferhat Abbas, through threats of violence.¹²⁵ It can further be assessed that proof of external support, such as from the Egyptian Government, might have further persuaded the remaining nationalists to join the FLN.

Likely learning from previous French tactics to defeat subversive threats by imprisoning the key leaders of threat organizations, the initial command structure of the ALN favored decentralized command. Before the FLN-ALN began the Algerian war, it

¹²³ Galula, 8.

¹²⁴ Clark, 114.

¹²⁵ Horne, 140.

was decided that the ALN would be sub-divided into six regional sectors, or areas of authority known as “wilaya.”¹²⁶ If one wilaya was overwhelmed by the French military, the remaining wilayas could continue operations. A well-respected ALN member was selected to command each wilaya and each wilaya commander was responsible for recruiting, training, resourcing, and leading, operations within his assigned area.¹²⁷ The initial attacks that occurred across Algeria on November 1, 1954 were planned and synchronized, after that, there would be limited communication or coordination amongst the wilaya commanders.¹²⁸

During the first two years of the revolution, decentralized execution favored the ALN; however, it also created confusions because it lacked a clear strategy and animosities developed between wilaya commanders because some zones had better access to supplies and weapons.¹²⁹ To resolve grievances, the ALN leadership made the decision to hold a meeting to establish mutually agreed on “tactics, strategy, and objectives.”¹³⁰ The Soummam Congress, as it became known, was held in the Soummam Valley on August 20, 1956 and it marked an important turning point in the Algerian War.¹³¹

¹²⁶ O’Ballance, 43.

¹²⁷ Ibid.

¹²⁸ Derradji, 122.

¹²⁹ Ibid., 124.

¹³⁰ Heggy, 168.

¹³¹ Derradji, 127.

The Soummam Congress included just over 200 ALN delegates from throughout Algeria and lasted twenty days.¹³² At the Soummam Congress, several key decisions were made: the wilayas were organized into a standardized structure, a rank system was developed, and a centralized committee of coordination and execution was established.¹³³ Similarly, at the Soummam Congress, ALN leaders agreed that a military victory against French forces by the ALN would be unrealistic; instead, their strategy would rely heavily on propaganda, counter-propaganda, and defeating the French through international pressure.¹³⁴ It was this vein of strategic thinking that led the ALN to see urban terrorism as a tactic to garner international attention; this ultimately led to the Battle of Algiers, which brought the FLN-ALN “to a very nearly catastrophic defeat.”¹³⁵

How and Why was Propaganda and Terrorism Used, and Who was the Target Audience?

Throughout the Algerian War, the FLN-ALN targeted three audiences with propaganda and terrorism, Muslims in Algeria, French in Algeria, and the international audience. By 1954, Cairo Radio and the pan-Arab radio propaganda campaign, known as the “voice of the Arabs,” had stoked the spirit of anti-colonialism throughout North Africa.¹³⁶ Capitalizing on anti-colonialist sentiments, ALN messaging campaigns within

¹³² O’Ballance, 70-71.

¹³³ Ibid., 74.

¹³⁴ Connelly, “Rethinking the Cold War and Decolonization,” 227.

¹³⁵ Horne, 146.

¹³⁶ Ibid., 85.

Algeria reinforced Muslim perceptions of inequality compared to the French colonists and the duty of every Muslim not to be governed by infidels.¹³⁷ As mentioned previously, propaganda alone was not enough to convince the opposing nationalist party members, or the Muslim population to support the ALN, it had to be combined with violence.

New recruits into the ALN were submitted to an indoctrination of revolutionary propaganda, after which they were enlisted conditionally until they committed their first act of terrorism for the cause.¹³⁸ At the end of their indoctrination, new recruits were officially initiated once they killed a traitor.¹³⁹ The ALN made it standard practice to declare any Algerian who would attempt to negotiate agreements with the French as a traitor of the cause and a target for assassination.¹⁴⁰ This fear of reprisal would prevent moderate Algerian nationalists from negotiating with French authorities.

The ALN have been criticized for their use of bombings, kidnappings, and other terrorist style guerilla attacks, which often resulted in civilian casualties. Within Algeria, the Muslim population more easily forgave the nationalists for the use of terrorist tactics as opposed to the “French alien rulers”.¹⁴¹ Within this terrorism paradox, the ALN were able to conduct almost sub-human attacks on French colonists and Algerians labeled as traitors. One successful, albeit brutal, example of the combined effects of ALN

¹³⁷ Heggooy, 140.

¹³⁸ Ibid., 137.

¹³⁹ Horne, 134.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., 135.

¹⁴¹ Heggooy, 138.

propaganda and terrorism was the Philippeville Massacre. On August 20, 1955, crowds of Muslims including women and children, intermixed with pockets of uniformed ALN fighters, launched a series of assaults on unarmed European colonists of all ages, from Bone to south of Constantine; the town of Philippeville faced the most severe attacks.¹⁴²

Following the Philippeville Massacre, French troops killed 1,250 Algerian men, women, and children.¹⁴³ The ALN had motivated the crowds into action through phrases likening their actions as the beginning of a holy war, and that the power of God was behind the Muslims.¹⁴⁴ Whether the ALN truly believed that mob violence and mass hysteria would result in a tactical advantage, it could be guaranteed that the death of unarmed European civilians would result in retaliation. In the weeks that followed the Philippeville Massacre, the relationship between Muslim and Europeans soured, commerce came to a halt, and “the ALN had won a psychological victory.”¹⁴⁵

The general theme of FLN-ALN propaganda directed at the French in Algeria was, “the suitcase or the coffin.”¹⁴⁶ This hyperbolic leave or die threat was coupled with terrorist attacks conducted by urban guerilla networks. These urban guerillas, unlike the rural guerillas, did not wear uniforms; they blended in with the population of the over-crowded cities, which gave them the ability to conduct clandestine operations without

¹⁴² Clark, 172-173.

¹⁴³ Ibid., 175.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., 173.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid., 180.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid., 165.

being identified.¹⁴⁷ Additionally, unlike the rural guerilla campaign, the goal of urban warfare was not to defeat the French Army and liberate zones; instead, it was designed to perpetuate a state of fear and ensure that every French citizen suspected every Muslim of being a terrorist.¹⁴⁸

In reaction to the urban terrorist attacks, the French developed a COIN strategy that required the use of torture.¹⁴⁹ To both gather intelligence on the nationalists and deter Algerians from supporting the guerillas, the French developed an un-written policy that justified torture.¹⁵⁰ By labeling their enemies as terrorists, the French inadvertently reduced the possibility of negotiating a political solution with the FLN-ALN.¹⁵¹ The tactic of torture, if applied indiscriminately, would have additionally driven potential fence sitters to support the ALN.

By January 1957, the ALN had realized they could not win a decisive victory against French military forces in the rural regions of Algeria, so it was decided that the campaign would shift towards urban warfare.¹⁵² The ALN had already learned that even smaller attacks, such as a grenade thrown amongst civilians in larger cities like Algiers,

¹⁴⁷ Derradji, 177.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid., 179.

¹⁴⁹ Raphaëlle Branche, “Torture of Terrorists? Use of Torture in a ‘War Against Terrorism’: Justifications, Methods, and Effects: The Case of France in Algeria, 1954-1962,” *International Review of the Red Cross* 89, no. 867 (September 2007): 549, accessed January 10, 2015, <http://search.proquest.com/>.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., 557.

¹⁵¹ Ibid., 559.

¹⁵² Heggyoy, 231.

would be a more effective propaganda tool than attacks in rural areas where there were less foreign press correspondents.¹⁵³ The timing of the Battle of Algiers was designed to coincide with the UN debates being held in January 1957, in which the French Algeria problem was scheduled to be discussed. Prior to the battle, the ALN leadership decreed a series of mass demonstrations within the city of Algiers to show the world and the French that the FLN led the Algerian people.¹⁵⁴ The Battle of Algiers quickly transcended from protests to “an orgy of blind terrorism,” when terrorists used the shelter of the over-crowded kasbahs to launch attacks throughout Algiers.¹⁵⁵

To win the urban Battle of Algiers, the French Resident-Minister granted policing and counter-terrorist responsibilities to the 10th Parachute Division of the French Army.¹⁵⁶ The Battle of Algiers increasingly escalated into violence begetting violence until the French paratroopers, isolated the kasbahs and completely dismantled a majority of the ALN guerilla networks within the city.¹⁵⁷ By August 1957, the French had won the tactical battle in the streets of Algiers, but within Algeria and abroad the nationalists had won the propaganda victory they had desired at a heavy cost. At the end of the Battle of Algiers over 24,000 Muslim Algerians had been sent to internment camps where torture

¹⁵³ Galula, 62.

¹⁵⁴ Heggyo, 232.

¹⁵⁵ Galula, 142.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid., 143.

was an accepted practice and many would never be seen again.¹⁵⁸ Popular support of the Muslim population within Algeria had also waned because of the constant violence; similarly, members of the ALN had grown frustrated with how little the urban campaign had accomplished.¹⁵⁹

Lessons Learned from the Algerian War

1. During the early phases of the Algerian War, terrorism and assassination of individuals opposing the FLN-ALN cause was necessary to enforce support.
2. Indiscriminate urban terrorism eroded popular support for the FLN-ALN within Algeria.
3. The FLN-ALN campaign would have likely failed had Egypt not provided FLN members with sanctuary and military support.
4. The FLN-ALN favored decentralized operations, but collective leadership.
During the first months of the war, the individual wilayas were too decentralized and although this allowed them to avoid French defeat, this tactic was unable to achieve any strategic gains.
5. When the ALN failed to win a decisive victory against the French military, it was the moderate politicians, specifically Ferhat Abbas who won the war of diplomacy internationally against France. Had the FLN-ALN not allowed the moderates to join their cause, it is unlikely they would have been successful.

¹⁵⁸ Connelly, “Rethinking the Cold War and Decolonization,” 229.

¹⁵⁹ Horne, 219.

Phase Two: Boko Haram Case Study

Background

To understand Boko Haram and to appreciate the organization's strategy, first it is necessary to establish the strategic environment in which the organization developed and continues to operate. Like Algeria in 1954, before its revolution, the effects of colonization has left Nigeria and its people without a national identity. Since the ninth century when Islam arrived in this region, Northern Nigeria has been home to several large Islamic dynasties that crossed the modern-era Nigerian borders into neighboring Cameroon, Niger, Chad, and Benin.¹⁶⁰ Many modern-day Northern Nigerians continue to trace their ethnic identities to the Islamic kingdoms of pre-colonial Nigeria.

Northern Nigeria can be characterized as having a history of jihad, as each Islamic dynasty fought for dominance and to convert others to their form of Islam. In 1804, Usman Dan Fodio established the Sokoto Caliphate, a powerful Caliphate in Northern Nigeria that combined the ethnic Fulani and Hausa people under one authority.¹⁶¹ The word Boko Haram is a Hausa derived term and many of its current members are Hausa and Fulani Muslims that likely trace their ethnic history to the era of the Sokoto Caliphate.

¹⁶⁰ N. I. O. and D. L-B. [pseud.], *Boko Haram: Between Myth and Reality* (CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2013), 9.

¹⁶¹ Jennifer Lofkrantz, "Protecting Freeborn Muslims: The Sokoto Caliphate's Attempts to Prevent Illegal Enslavement and its Acceptance of the Strategy of Ransoming," *Slavery and Abolition* 32, no. 1 (March 2011): 110, accessed April 9, 2015, www.web.a.ebscohost.com.

In 1903, the British West African Frontier Force was required to subdue the Sokoto Caliphate through military force.¹⁶² After their expansion into Northern Nigeria, the British colonial authority made two decisions that had lasting impacts on the region. First, the Sultan and his subordinate leaders who would not submit to British authority were removed from power, but their Sharia-based systems of authority and governance remained intact.¹⁶³ Second, the British desired economic access to Northern Nigeria which required the building of modern infrastructure. With the British economic advancement into the North, large camps of Southern Igbo and Yoruba tribe members, who were predominately Christian, moved north for employment.¹⁶⁴

The legacy of the Sokoto Caliphate has two lasting implications for modern-day Nigeria and Boko Haram: a persistent fear of possible enslavement and the politicization of Islam. The fear of enslavement was an unpleasant fact in early Nigerian History; as the Sokoto Caliphate rose to power, the jihad of Usman Dan Fodio was a result of his desire to prevent his ethnic Fulani from being enslaved by the dominant ethnic Hausa kingdoms in Nigeria.¹⁶⁵ Sultan Dan Fodio made it illegal to enslave freeborn Muslims within his Caliphate. Anyone found within the Sokoto Caliphate, which encompassed 150,000

¹⁶² Jonathan T. Reynolds, “The Politics of History,” *Journal of Asian and African Studies* 32, no. 1-2 (June 1997): 51, accessed April 9, 2015, www.web.a.ebscohost.com.

¹⁶³ Ibid.

¹⁶⁴ Michael O. Sodipo, “Mitigating Radicalism in Northern Nigeria,” *Africa Security Brief* no. 26 (2013): 3, accessed September 10, 2014, <http://www.africacenter.org>.

¹⁶⁵ Lofkrantz, 114.

square miles and more than eight million people, who did not follow “pure Islamic Law” could be enslaved and have their property confiscated.¹⁶⁶

Northern Nigeria and much of the Sub-Saharan Sahel region of Africa is, and has been, an agrarian-based society for centuries. Throughout the nineteenth century, individual states within the Caliphate constantly invaded neighboring villages and towns to pillage and capture slaves to work on their plantations.¹⁶⁷ These spoils of war were a primary source of income for the Caliphate, and similarly many of the fighters who waged war for the Caliphate did so eagerly for the prospective windfall of slaves and booty.¹⁶⁸ Like the Sokoto Caliphate, Boko Haram continues to capture slaves and pillage through their attacks on villages and towns in Northern Nigeria, as well as neighboring Chad and Cameroon.

Second, through the politicization of Islam, power, status, and authority, within the Caliphate could be conferred to Nigerians who adhered to the purest interpretation of the Koran. After gaining independence in 1960, Nigeria has been plagued by an economy that cycles through booms and busts due to an over-reliance on Nigerian oil revenues.¹⁶⁹ Along with the surge in profits generated from international oil prices in the 1970s, there was a dramatic rise in the number of “increasingly zealous political actors” who were

¹⁶⁶ Ibid.

¹⁶⁷ Murray Last, “Contradictions in Creating a Jihadi Capital: Sokoto in the Nineteenth Century and its Legacy,” *African Studies Review* 56, no. 2 (September 2013): 11, accessed October 18, 2014, <http://search.proquest.com/>.

¹⁶⁸ Lofkrantz, 118.

¹⁶⁹ BBC, “Nigeria Profile-Overview,” March 1, 2015, accessed March 27, 2015, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13949550>.

propagating strict interpretations of Christianity and Islam in Nigeria.¹⁷⁰ Primarily as result of the obvious discrepancy between surges in Nigerian oil revenues and wide spread poverty, the Nigerian Government transitioned authority by military coup from independence until 1999; each successive government claimed their plan to fix the economy would work, because the previous government was corrupt.¹⁷¹

In 1999, after Nigeria successfully elected a President, Olusegun Obasanjo, a Christian from the Igbo tribe, it inadvertently increased the number of “ethnic and religious groups pursuing their demands through violence.”¹⁷² Not long after President Obasanjo became president, the organization now commonly referred to as Boko Haram came into being. Boko Haram’s founder, Mohammed Yusuf, was born in Yobe State of Northeastern Nigeria, where he studied Islam under the Iranian-funded Islamic Movement of Nigeria.¹⁷³ Yusuf and other members of the movement broke away from the predominantly Shia sect, due to influence by Saudi Arabian Wahhabi efforts to prevent the spread of Shia Islam in Africa.¹⁷⁴ After this departure, Yusuf’s ideology became more aligned with the stricter Salafist interpretation of Islam.

¹⁷⁰ Sodipo, 3.

¹⁷¹ Encyclopedia Britannica, s.v. “Nigeria,” accessed March 27, 2015, <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/414840/Nigeria/259740/Return-to-civilian-rule>.

¹⁷² BBC, “Nigeria Profile-Overview.”

¹⁷³ Zenn, “Nigerian Al-Qaedaism,” 100.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid.

Yusuf often referenced and integrated the writings of a Salafist scholar from Saudi Arabia, Abu Zayd, into messages to his followers during the early days of Boko Haram.¹⁷⁵ Abu Zayd's books centered on secular education as a "conspiracy to maintain colonialist hegemony over Muslims."¹⁷⁶ The lessons provided by Abu Zayd gave Yusuf a method to strengthen his position amongst the Muslim population in Northern Nigeria by proving that his interpretation of the Koran was the purest.

It was 2003 when Mohammed Yusuf and his radical Muslim followers created their version of Afghanistan, or an Islamic state in Yobe State of Northeast Nigeria, going as far as flying Taliban flags.¹⁷⁷ This "state within a state" established a government, police force, and even offered forms of social welfare to anyone willing to follow their brand of Islam.¹⁷⁸ Beginning around this time Yusuf began to expand his span of control and influence beyond his home, Yobe State, into neighboring Borno State. In 2004, militants under Yusuf's command conducted attacks on police stations in Borno State and Yusuf established a school and a mosque in Maiduguri, the capital of Borno State.¹⁷⁹

On the evening of June 11, 2009 a police security patrol participating in Operation FLUSH, an effort to curb violence in Borno State, had a violent clash with members of

¹⁷⁵ "The Popular Discourses of Salafi Radicalism and Salafi Counter-Radicalism in Nigeria," 123.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷⁷ Bamidele, 12.

¹⁷⁸ Innocent and Onyishi, 9.

¹⁷⁹ Bamidele, 12-13.

Boko Haram that resulted in seventeen militants being shot.¹⁸⁰ The accounts differ on whether the Boko Haram members were armed, but Yusuf claimed that his followers were unarmed and this attack was another example of abuse by state security forces.¹⁸¹ Perhaps overzealously, Yusuf made this incident his Alamo moment and allowed it to be the catalyst for declaring war on the Nigerian Government.

After issuing open letters to the “fake President of Nigeria” and the “lowly weakling Governor of Borno State,” Yusuf gave orders to his followers to prepare for battle.¹⁸² Yusuf’s followers began rioting and conducting attacks on police stations throughout Bauchi, Yobe, and Borno States. Following the surge in violence the Bauchi State Government launched an operation that captured over 700 members of Boko Haram.¹⁸³ A similar operation by the Borno State Government involved a police raid on Yusuf’s mosque in Maiduguri. Eventually through a series of raids on Boko Haram in July 2009, the Borno police had captured and killed over a dozen suspected militants without trial, including Mohammed Yusuf.¹⁸⁴ Following the death of Yusuf, the violence subsided and Boko Haram appears to have taken a year to regroup before returning in 2010.

¹⁸⁰ “The Popular Discourses of Salafi Radicalism and Salafi Counter-Radicalism in Nigeria,” 129.

¹⁸¹ Ibid.

¹⁸² Ibid., 130.

¹⁸³ Innocent and Onyishi, 9.

¹⁸⁴ Ibid.

It is not clear where the members of Boko Haram sought refuge following the security crackdown in 2009. It is however suspected that during this interim period, members of Boko Haram were training at camps in Algeria and Mali.¹⁸⁵ After the exodus Abubakar bin Mohammed Shekau, Yusuf's deputy, surprisingly appeared in an Al Qaeda style video in July 2010 appointing himself as the leader of Boko Haram and threatening revenge against the Nigerian Government.¹⁸⁶ The death of Mohammed Yusuf and appointment of Abubakar Shekau as its new leader signaled a significant transition in Boko Haram. Fueled by vengeance, Boko Haram's new jihad began a campaign of violence directed at any person who Boko Haram members declared to be unbelievers, not just the Nigerian Government. Based on the evidence available, this new Boko Haram is determined to create their own Caliphate in Northern Nigeria, and believes it is their right to enslave, kill, and claim the possessions of non-believers.

How did the Insurgents Establish and Leverage Popular Support?

The founder of Boko Haram, Mohammed Yusuf, was charismatic and an “eloquent public speaker.”¹⁸⁷ Through diplomacy, between 2004 and 2008, Yusuf was able to establish relationships with eight Northern Nigeria State Governors, which provided monetary donations to Boko Haram, estimated to range from \$35,000 to

¹⁸⁵ Ibid.

¹⁸⁶ Bamidele, 14.

¹⁸⁷ N. I. O. and D. L-B. [pseud.], 13.

\$70,000 US dollars a month.¹⁸⁸ With extensive financing, Yusuf was able to expand membership within his Islamic state. Muslims from Northern Nigeria, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon, flocked to join Yusuf's Nigerian Taliban.¹⁸⁹ By the time he was killed, Yusuf's Nigerian Taliban, which was commonly referred to as Boko Haram, had over one million members.¹⁹⁰

There are several assumed motivations for why many Northern Nigerians supported, and continue to support, Boko Haram. First, many Northern Nigerians see Boko Haram as a reaction against injustice and government corruption. During an interview with several tribal elders from Maiduguri, the capital of Borno State, reporter Alex Perry notes that these tribal elders had a video of Nigerian Soldiers beating a group of defenseless young men in the Maiduguri market, their only crime was that they were suspected Boko Haram members.¹⁹¹ Similarly, in an interview with a university professor from Maiduguri, it was noted that corrupt government officials had frequently confiscated finances that should have paid the salaries of teachers and doctors.¹⁹² Boko Haram's violence therefore gains legitimacy by claiming it is fighting "on behalf of the

¹⁸⁸ Ibid., 19.

¹⁸⁹ Jacob Zenn, *Northern Nigeria's Boko Haram: The Prize in Al-Qaeda's Africa Strategy* (Washington, DC: The Jamestown Foundation, 2012), Executive Summary.

¹⁹⁰ N. I. O. and D. L-B. [pseud.], 21.

¹⁹¹ Alex Perry, *The Hunt for Boko Haram: Investigating the Terror Tearing Nigeria Apart* (London: Newsweek Insights, 2014), 53-54.

¹⁹² Ibid., 54.

economically destitute who are rarely granted the rights guaranteed to them by Nigerian constitution,” many of whom live on less than a dollar a day.¹⁹³

The second assumed motivation for Northern Nigerians to support Boko Haram is the popular belief amongst Nigerian Muslims that democratically elected Christian presidents from Southern Nigeria is part of a Christian conspiracy. Northern Nigerians have a much lower education and literacy rate than the Southern Christian populations; as a result, a common belief in the North is that Muslims are the majority of the Nigerian population, and there should be no way that a Muslim would not get elected, unless the election was fraudulent.¹⁹⁴ Similarly, in a country where violence is an acceptable means for addressing political grievances, after a Southern Christian has been the Nigerian President for sixteen years, Northern Nigerian power brokers might see Boko Haram as a means to hasten the return of a Northern Nigerian Muslim to the presidency.

While Boko Haram, under Mohammed Yusuf’s leadership, can be characterized as practicing jihad through civil disobedience and dialogue, it can be assumed that eventually their ultra-radical Salafist interpretation of Islam would result in violence. Violence, when it occurred, during Yusuf’s tenure was directed at the Nigerian Government and their security forces. After Boko Haram returned from their exodus in 2010, following Yusuf’s death, and under the command of their new leader, Abubakar

¹⁹³ Oarhe Osumah, “Boko Haram Insurgency in Northern Nigeria and the Vicious Cycle of Internal Insecurity,” *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 24, no. 3 (August 2013): 542, accessed March 19, 2015, <http://www.tandfonline.com>.

¹⁹⁴ Zenn, *Northern Nigeria’s Boko Haram*, 10.

Shekau, there has been no limit to the levels of violence that Boko Haram has been willing to perpetrate.

Yusuf and Shekau share several biographical commonalities. Both were born in Yobe State in Northeast Nigeria and studied Islamic theology.¹⁹⁵ Yusuf however, can be credited as the “catalyst”, or the founder of a movement that brings individuals who share a common vision together and then withdraws from an active leadership role while the organization continues to grow.¹⁹⁶ Granted Yusuf’s withdrawal was not by choice, his death reinforced the legitimacy of Boko Haram’s narrative. Even prominent members of the Nigerian Government who did not agree with Boko Haram’s methods were upset with Yusuf’s torture and death in police custody.¹⁹⁷ Before Yusuf, few people in Nigeria had heard of the organization that became Boko Haram.¹⁹⁸ At the time of his death, Yusuf had been able to amass a large base of support and Boko Haram had become a source of power and authority in Northeast Nigeria.

In contrast to Yusuf, Shekau is a man of action.¹⁹⁹ While Yusuf, and more importantly his extra-judicial death by Nigerian security forces, served as the catalyst for

¹⁹⁵ BBC News, “Nigeria’s Boko Haram Leader Abubakar Shekau in Profile,” last modified May 9, 2014, accessed May 4, 2015, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-18020349>; Abeeb Salaam, “The Psychological Make-up of Mohammed Yusuf,” in *Boko Haram: Anatomy of Crisis*, ed. Ioannis Mantzikos (Bristol, UK: e-International Relations, 2013), 47, accessed September 11, 2014, www.e-ir.info.

¹⁹⁶ Ori Brafman and Rod A. Beckstrom, *The Starfish and the Spider* (New York: Portfolio, 2006), 92.

¹⁹⁷ N. I. O. and D. L-B. [pseud.], 25-26.

¹⁹⁸ Adibe, 12.

¹⁹⁹ Zenn, “Nigerian Al-Qaedaism,” 107.

present-day Boko Haram, Shekau has been their champion. The champion of a decentralized network, like Boko Haram, is the individual “who takes up the reins and hyperactively drives the group forward.”²⁰⁰ Shekau has been characterized as a fanatical leader, who lacks proper Islamic education and was even feared by the early leaders of Boko Haram.²⁰¹ Some have even attributed the increasingly militant Boko Haram activities that resulted in clashes with local police, and ultimately Yusuf’s death, to Shekau. Specifically, Shekau may have led several Boko Haram members to attack Nigerian security forces.²⁰² Yusuf built the vision for Boko Haram, and after his death, Shekau has carried that vision forward.

Since 2011, Boko Haram under Shekau’s guidance has pursued a campaign of bombings, kidnappings, executions, and raids that has killed thousands of Nigerians, both Muslim and non-Muslim alike.²⁰³ While Boko Haram continues attacks directed at the Nigerian Government and security forces, which would have been acceptable under Mohammed Yusuf, it has increasingly resorted to raiding villages, forcing Northern Nigerians to join Boko Haram or face execution. Their campaign of terror has even spilled over into neighboring Cameroon and Chad. Without security provided by the Nigerian Government, the average villager has little choice, but to submit to Boko

²⁰⁰ Brafman and Beckstrom, 99.

²⁰¹ BBC News, “Boko Haram: Who is Abubakar Shekau?” (video), posted June 27, 2014, accessed March 19, 2015, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DnQ1tVlr8vk>.

²⁰² Zenn, “Nigerian Al-Qaedaism,” 107.

²⁰³ CNN, “Boko Haram: Fast Facts,” June 9, 2014, accessed March 27, 2015, <http://www.cnn.com/2014/06/09/world/boko-haram-fast-facts/>.

Haram, or have his or her head cut off, their children taken as prisoners, their possessions confiscated, and their house burned.²⁰⁴

During the last two years the Nigerian Government has declared, two states of emergency in Northern Nigeria; both times Boko Haram members were tipped off about the location of Nigerian military patrols and avoided capture.²⁰⁵ Following the state of emergency on 18-19 September 2013, members of Boko Haram set up checkpoints along the highway outside of Maiduguri killing anyone from Maiduguri who presumably provided information to the Nigerian military. During this event, a Boko Haram executioner used an electric saw to remove victims' heads.²⁰⁶ Like the early days of the ALN in Algeria, Boko Haram is applying tactics of fear and intimidation to coerce popular support; however, Algerian tactics were accepted as legitimate, because they were primarily applied during the earlier phases of the insurgency. It is yet to be seen if Boko Haram's excessive violence will be perceived as legitimate.

How did the Insurgents Establish and Leverage External Support?

Boko Haram's attempts to establish external support, similar to the vast extent of military and ideological support that the FLN was able to achieve, has been unsuccessful.

²⁰⁴ "Cameroon: War Against Boko Haram," (video), Sky News, posted July 13, 2014, accessed March 19, 2015, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v4nJdTtH3ng>.

²⁰⁵ United States Institute Of Peace, *Why Do Youth Join Boko Haram?* Freedom C. Onuoha, Special Report 348 (Washington, DC: United States Institute Of Peace, June 2014), 4, accessed March 27, 2015, <http://www.usip.org/publications/why-do-youth-join-boko-haram>.

²⁰⁶ N. I. O. and D. L-B. [pseud.], 40.

In a 2003 statement, the former head of Al Qaeda, Osama Bin Laden, did in fact single out Nigeria as a place that was “ready for liberation.”²⁰⁷ Similarly, there is evidence that Boko Haram has an established relationship with Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), as well as links with multiple militant Islamic groups throughout the Sahel region of Africa.²⁰⁸ However, Boko Haram lacks an external sponsor like Egypt’s Gamel Abd Al Nasser.

In 2009, following a series of security operations by the Nigerian military to dismantle this militant sect, members of Boko Haram fled Nigeria. A year later, the group’s return was marked by two public decrees: one by Yusuf’s former deputy, Shekau, claiming to be the new leader of Boko Haram, and the second, the Emir of AQIM promised support for Boko Haram during an interview with Al Jazeera news.²⁰⁹

In addition, after Boko Haram’s return, the group’s use of bombs, car bombs, and coordinated assaults on Nigerian military facilities, implies that Boko Haram members had most likely received both materiel support and training from external militant organizations. The August 26, 2011 car bomb used to attack the UN building in Abuja, consisted of 125 kilograms of explosives formed into a cone shape that was so effective “it crumpled a water tower 300 feet away like it was cardboard.”²¹⁰ Before 2009, Boko

²⁰⁷ Zenn, *Northern Nigeria’s Boko Haram*, executive summary.

²⁰⁸ Innocent and Onyishi, 9.

²⁰⁹ Bamidele, 13.

²¹⁰ Perry, 48.

Haram attacks were limited to small arms engagements; this new Boko Haram had expanded its violent repertoire significantly.

Shekau has consistently sought to align Boko Haram with larger, more powerful, Islamic militant groups, such as AQIM and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). In a statement in 2012, Shekau praised the “soldiers of God in the Islamic State of Mali,” but only a year later one of AQIM’s religious leaders issued a fatwa against Boko Haram after some of its members killed seventy sleeping students at a dormitory in Yobe State.²¹¹ For Al Qaeda and its affiliates, their jihad is against the West. Given Boko Haram’s continued assault on anyone in Nigeria, non-Muslim or Muslim, it is unlikely that Boko Haram will receive more than limited support from the AQ network. However, a relationship with ISIL, which has been willing to kill Muslims and non-Muslims, would reinforce Boko Haram’s violent narrative.

Since Yusuf’s death, Boko Haram under Shekau has managed to expand their operations into neighboring Chad and Cameroon, likely to avoid Nigerian military patrols. Boko Haram reportedly has ties to illegal smuggling operations, specifically weapons trafficking.²¹² Over seventy percent of the illegal weapons and ammunition shipments destined for West Africa pass through Northern Nigeria.²¹³ Boko Haram has

²¹¹ Zenn, “Nigerian Al-Qaedaism,” 111.

²¹² Jacob Zenn, “Boko Haram: Recruitment, Financing, and Arms Trafficking in the Lake Chad Region,” *CTC Sentinel* 7, no. 10 (October 2014): 6, accessed March 19, 2015, <https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/boko-haram-recruitment-financing-and-arms-trafficking-in-the-lake-chad-region>.

²¹³ Zenn, *Northern Nigeria’s Boko Haram*, 8.

the ability to resupply its fighters, and guarantee safe passage for these illegal shipments in exchange for payment.

Along with illegal weapons, Boko Haram has a stake in the smuggling of illegal drugs. One former member of Boko Haram confessed that before operations, their fighters would often ingest painkillers and it is “drugs more than anything else that feeds their sadistic acts.”²¹⁴ This former member’s confession corroborates reports by Cameroonian police that after the forced recruitment of approximately 500 men from villages along the Nigerian border, the new recruits were taken to Boko Haram training camps and drugged.²¹⁵ The widespread use of drugs, along with the sadistic nature of Boko Haram executions, will likely reduce their legitimacy and popular support.

It is likely that since 2010 Boko Haram has experienced a decrease in financial patronage. Boko Haram has increasingly conducted kidnapping-for-ransom operations to raise funds.²¹⁶ Freedom Onuoha, head of the Department of Conflict, Peacekeeping, and Humanitarian Assistance at the Center for Strategic Research and Studies of Nigeria’s National Defense College, similarly notes that Boko Haram raises funds by raiding banks, extorting local villagers, and intimidating wealthy individuals for protection fees.²¹⁷ Like the Sokoto Caliphate, Boko Haram has to offer its members financial compensation for their service. As Boko Haram membership grows, the need for funding

²¹⁴ Akpan, Ekanem, and Olofu-Adeoye, 152.

²¹⁵ Zenn, “Boko Haram: Recruitment, Financing, and Arms Trafficking in the Lake Chad Region,” 8.

²¹⁶ Ibid.

²¹⁷ United States Institute Of Peace, *Why Do Youth Join Boko Haram?*, 3.

will concurrently increase, as will their requirement to conduct illicit activities to collect funds.

How did the Insurgents Develop Unity?

As previously noted, during the early phases of Boko Haram under Mohammed Yusuf's leadership, 2003 to 2009, Boko Haram offered a “state within a state” that provided social welfare to members and their families, as well as a justice system and protection from the Christian central government.²¹⁸ By exploiting perceptions that the Nigerian Government was either unwilling, or unable to provide an economic, security, or a justice system that responded to the needs of Northern Nigerians, Boko Haram appealed to a large number of impoverished Muslims living in Northern Nigeria. Similarly, by establishing a narrative that Yusuf's Boko Haram was providing for the basic needs of local Muslims, Boko Haram was a legitimate recipient of financial donations from wealthy Muslims, an Islamic requirement known as ‘Zakat.’ The power of Boko Haram under Yusuf, that attracted members and popular support, was the narrative that Boko Haram was a reaction to endemic poverty, corruption, and injustice.

After Yusuf's death, under the leadership of Abubakar Shekau, Boko Haram did not change the narrative that Yusuf had established; however, their activities since 2010 have been more violent and less directed at addressing poverty, corruption, or injustice. While holding on to Yusuf's original doctrine, Boko Haram has developed a strategy that

²¹⁸ Innocent and Onyishi, 8.

relies heavily on guerilla warfare and territorial control.²¹⁹ To avoid the same fate as the original Boko Haram under Yusuf suffered, this new Boko Haram could not afford to build a state within a state, as this would provide the Nigerian military too easy a target to isolate and destroy.

To wage a guerilla campaign against the technologically superior Nigerian military, Boko Haram had to expand their amount of available fighters. Since 2010, Boko Haram has increasingly recruited young men from Borno and Yobe States in Northeast Nigeria, as well as villages in Cameroon and Chad along the Nigerian border. These areas are fertile grounds for militant recruitment because there is a large population of displaced people and refugees, who are mostly Hausa Muslims.²²⁰ Internally displaced people are vulnerable to extremist recruitment. Displaced Muslims are likely willing to conduct attacks on Christian targets for Boko Haram in exchange for protection or money for their families.²²¹ Even when displaced people are unwilling to join Boko Haram, it has become standard practice for Boko Haram members to force recruitment.²²²

Poverty, unemployment, and a lack of education, would increase the likelihood that young men in Northern Nigeria would join Boko Haram; however, for those unwilling, their recruitment is not optional. It is a regular occurrence in Cameroon's

²¹⁹ Zenn, "Boko Haram: Recruitment, Financing, and Arms Trafficking in the Lake Chad Region," 10.

²²⁰ N. I. O. and D. L-B. [pseud.], 37.

²²¹ Ibid.

²²² Zenn, "Boko Haram: Recruitment, Financing, and Arms Trafficking in the Lake Chad Region," 8.

towns along the Nigerian border for Boko Haram patrols to show up at night: demand that young men join them, steal needed supplies, and finally set the houses of those who refuse to support them on fire.²²³ While the decision to join Boko Haram or face death would initially result in compliance, it can be expected that some forced recruits might attempt to escape and return to their villages. In a video of a Boko Haram attack on the Maiduguri military barracks, columns of Boko Haram members are seen marching against a fortified perimeter while another member shouts from a loud speaker that they should not fear death. Meanwhile, automatic weapons are trained on these Boko Haram fighters as if to prevent anyone from running away.²²⁴ To reduce this requirement of forced recruitment, it seems Boko Haram would have to incentivize recruitment to sustain the requirements of a protracted guerilla war.

Like the ALN, Boko Haram has facilitated recruitment and commitment through the ideological indoctrination of recruits. Both organizations heavily recruited young Muslims and motivated them with the Islamic principle of jihad and the requirement not to be governed by infidels or un-believers. Unlike the ALN, Boko Haram has recruited and begun indoctrination of children as young as four.²²⁵ It is further estimated that the average age of Boko Haram fighters is thirty years old.²²⁶ Young Muslim men are an

²²³ “Cameroon: War Against Boko Haram,” (video), Sky News, posted July 13, 2014, accessed March 19, 2015, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v4nJdTtH3ng>.

²²⁴ Terrorism Research and Analysis Consortium, “Actual Attack on Barracks Carried out by Boko Haram,” (video) posted March 26, 2014, accessed March 19, 2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D8_pP24CIJ0.

²²⁵ Perry, 3.

²²⁶ United States Institute Of Peace, *Why Do Youth Join Boko Haram*, 5.

ideal demographic for Boko Haram's indoctrination. Because a majority of the youth in Northern Nigeria lack access to education, Boko Haram is able to teach their distorted interpretation of Islam, which makes Boko Haram fighters willing to accept martyrdom.²²⁷

When Boko Haram kidnapped over 250 Christian schoolgirls from Chibok, Borno State in April 2014, it created international attention and concern for the future of the schoolgirls. Initially, Shekau appeared in an online video a month after the kidnap threatening to sell the girls on the open market and proclaiming that the Nigerian Government, the US, and UN, could not do anything to stop it.²²⁸ It is more likely that the school girls were kidnapped specifically to serve as concubines and slaves for Boko Haram militants.²²⁹ Like the feudal armies of Western Europe, Boko Haram appears to inspire militants to conduct raids with the promise of claiming the spoils of war, even concubines. Similarly, by fathering children, Boko Haram has the ability to begin the indoctrination of their next generation of militants at birth, rather than through the forced recruitment of children.

Like most insurgencies, one of Boko Haram's strengths is their members' and supporters' anonymity. In Northern Nigeria it is impossible to determine who is a Boko Haram member or supporter, as a result it is a safe assumption that anyone could be. "If

²²⁷ Ibid.

²²⁸ The Guardian, "Boko Haram Leader: We Will Sell the Girls on the Market," (video), posted May 6, 2014, accessed March 19, 2015, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fwki6g9brqo>.

²²⁹ Zenn, "Boko Haram: Recruitment, Financing, and Arms Trafficking in the Lake Chad Region," 7.

you live in Northern Nigeria and you want your head to remain on your neck, you had better not express any negative views of Boko Haram whether it is true or not.”²³⁰ Like the ALN, Boko Haram maintains unity by executing or disciplining anyone who threatens Boko Haram. In the villages they have conquered, Boko Haram governs with a heavy hand. Violators of Boko Haram’s rules are either stoned to death, have their hands cut off, or are whipped, while the entire village watches.²³¹

In Boko Haram’s various videos it is important to note that Abubakar Shekau is not always seen as the central figure. Shekau is usually presented as the central figure when videos relate to the Boko Haram narrative, such as proclaiming Boko Haram’s successful attacks, propagating a holy war, or defying the Nigerian Government, the US or UN. The available execution videos, and videos that involve carrying out punishments for breaking Boko Haram’s rules, are centered on Boko Haram’s subordinate leaders, not Shekau.

It can be assessed that Boko Haram’s organizational structure allows for decentralized autonomy for decisions such as executions, but overall strategy decisions are likely central to Shekau. It can be assumed that individual subordinate leaders within Boko Haram have latitude to conduct operations that fit within Shekau’s strategy, and the narrative that carried over from Mohammed Yusuf. The death of Shekau would only have

²³⁰ N. I. O. and D. L-B. [pseud.], 16.

²³¹ Sahara TV, “How Boko Haram Militants Brutally Govern Captured Territories in Northeastern Nigeria,” (Video), posted October 5, 2014, accessed March 19, 2015, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L1dc1OiWuNA>.

temporary effects on Boko Haram's organizational structure, since it can be assumed that a subordinate leader could easily fill the leadership void and continue the jihad.

How and Why was Propaganda and Terrorism Used, and Who was the Target Audience?

As of 2009, there were almost forty-four million registered internet users in Nigeria, making Nigeria ninth in the world for internet users.²³² After Boko Haram's exodus, their new leader, Shekau, appeared in a video posted online in July 2010 proclaiming a new campaign of vengeance directed at the Nigerian Government and Western outposts in Nigeria.²³³ Since 2010, Boko Haram has extensively relied on videos posted online to brag about successful attacks and defy the Nigerian Government and its security forces. Videos posted online appear to be Boko Haram's preferred medium for spreading propaganda, there were limited references to Boko Haram leaflets discovered during data collection.

It is important to appreciate the subtle context contained in many of Boko Haram's videos. First, aside from the Islamic verses, which are all in the official language of the Koran - Arabic, the rest of the videos are in the Hausa language and do not contain subtitles, unless a second party has taken the time to translate the narrative. The Hausa language is only spoken in sections of Nigeria, Niger, Cameroon, and Chad.²³⁴ As a

²³² Central Intelligence Agency, "Nigeria."

²³³ Bamidele, 14.

²³⁴ Humboldt University of Berlin, "The Hausa Language" last modified March 21, 2013, accessed April 4, 2015, <https://www.iaaw.hu-berlin.de/en/africa/linguistik-und-sprachen/african-languages/hausa/standardpage>.

result, it may be assessed that because of this language choice, Boko Haram videos are predominately focused on a regional audience.

English is Nigeria's official language; but throughout the videos discovered by searching www.youtube.com, English words are rarely included in Boko Haram propaganda videos. After kidnapping the two hundred and fifty schoolgirls from Chihbok, Shekau posted a video on May 6, 2014 declaring war on Christians and challenging the audience that they are either with Boko Haram or Obama, George Bush, Clinton, Hollande, Abraham Lincoln and Ban Ki Moon.²³⁵ While English was used in this particular video, the video was over fifty-six minutes long and contained limited English intermixed with a waxing soliloquy by Shekau in the Hausa language.

Because English is the state language of Nigeria, the English phrases contained in Boko Haram videos are not indicative of a desire to target Western audiences, but instead Nigerians. Shekau's reference to President Abraham Lincoln, who died over 150 years ago, is an obscure reference. One interpretation is that Shekau chose this reference, because President Lincoln is an easily recognized American figure. Similarly, Shekau's inclusion of this reference highlights his lack of education and the lack of education he expects of his audience, concerning American history. This example further supports the assessment that Boko Haram's propaganda videos are not aimed at Western audiences.

Second, how Shekau delivers his messages in videos is important. In almost all of his videos he is reading from a prepared script. He begins each video with Islamic verses,

²³⁵ Terrorism Research and Analysis Consortium, "Boko Haram's Shekau on the Abduction of Chihbok School Girls," posted May 6, 2014, accessed April 4, 2015, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Vm2LdvevMBU>.

which are also read from a script. It seems unusual that a leader of a radical Islamic group would need a script for common Islamic verses, which should be rehearsed and recited much like an American might recite the Pledge of Allegiance. Even when Shekau visits a mosque in a Boko Haram controlled town to speak through a public announcement system, he uses a script.²³⁶ Shekau appears to be at most forty years old, and in most of his videos, he seems less like a polished religious leader, or Imam, and more like a young militant with limited public speaking skills. Additionally, in most of his videos he often asks rhetorical open ended questions and then laughs out loud, as if he was telling an inside joke. The fact that Shekau's videos are not dismissed outright for their amateur nature can only be due to the reality that Shekau's threats are supported by Boko Haram attacks.

Next, it is important to note the presence of a black flag with Arabic script in all of Boko Haram's propaganda videos. The white Arabic script on the black flag is the Shahada, one of the five pillars of Islam, an Islamic proclamation of faith, which states "there is no god but Allah, and Muhammed is his messenger."²³⁷ The black flag displaying the Shahada is often seen in online videos created by ISIL, as well as most Islamic militant groups. Boko Haram's use of this symbol in their videos is important because it is identifiable by both Muslims and non-Muslims. Similarly, by displaying the

²³⁶ KiniTV, "New Video Shows Scenes Inside Boko Haram-Controlled Town," (video), posted November 25, 2014, accessed March 19, 2015, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GIsPW4anHUM>.

²³⁷ Dictionary.com, "Shahada," accessed April 26, 2015, <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/shahada>.

flag in their videos, Boko Haram gains the legitimacy of associating their cause with a larger trans-national Islamic militancy.

Finally, a majority of Boko Haram videos parade police and military equipment captured by Boko Haram as if to mock Nigerian security forces. Similarly, Boko Haram has posted videos of the beheading of a Nigerian Air Force pilot, whose aircraft was supposedly downed by Boko Haram.²³⁸ Other videos have documented successful attacks by swarms of Boko Haram militants on fortified Nigerian military facilities in Northern Nigeria, and another video documents members of the Nigerian Army running from a Boko Haram attack.²³⁹ Boko Haram videos that highlight the beheadings of Nigerian security force personnel, and the success of Boko Haram when attacking fortified Nigerian military facilities, are likely designed to engender a sense of fear amongst Nigerian security forces. These videos reinforce reports from Cameroon that hundreds of Nigerian Soldiers fleeing Boko Haram had crossed the border and turned in their weapons.²⁴⁰

Following their decent into violence in 2009, Boko Haram has increasingly conducted attacks on anyone and anything that will not submit to their authority. As their

²³⁸ SaharaTV, “Boko Haram Militants Behead a Nigerian Air Force Pilot,” (video), posted October 5, 2014, accessed March 19, 2015, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bNq0DIqgR5A&bpctr=1426820339>.

²³⁹ Kayode Ogundamisi, “Boko Haram Invade Nigerian Town Chasing Nigerian Military to the Mountains in Borno State,” posted August 25, 2014, accessed March 19, 2015, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7dg4fna60eA>.

²⁴⁰ The Soufan Group, *The TSG IntelBrief: Boko Haram Takes, Holds Territory* (Columbia University Press, October 2014), accessed March 19, 2015, <http://www.ciaonet.org.lumen.cgscarl.com/pbei/tsg/0032526/>.

name implies, Boko Haram was established around a Salafist Muslim ideology that makes anything that represents Western influence a viable target for attack. Between 2009 and 2013, the majority of Boko Haram attacks targeted private citizens and their property, the second most targeted demographic by Boko Haram are Nigerian police and police facilities.²⁴¹ Hidden within the statistics is the reality that the term private citizens is not limited to non-Musims. During the early years of Boko Haram, under Yusuf's leadership, Yusuf applied Salafist teachings as a way to justify attacking Nigerian security forces.²⁴² Shekau has expanded the Salafist concept of purifying Islam to include anyone perceived to be a bad Muslim and an enemy of Boko Haram.

According to the Global Terrorism Database, of the 907 attacks associated with Boko Haram since 2009, the most used style of attack has been gunfire and the second most has been bombings.²⁴³ The database's term bombing is inclusive of Boko Haram's use of suicide bombers, as well as vehicle-borne explosive devices. Suicide attacks did not happen in Nigeria until a Boko Haram member drove a car bomb into the Abuja police headquarters on June 6, 2011.²⁴⁴ Since that particular attack, Boko Haram has only used vehicle borne bombs on two other occasions, an August 2011 attack on the UN

²⁴¹ National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, *Boko Haram: Background Report* (College Park, MD: University of Maryland, 2014), 3, accessed April 4, 2015, www.start.umd.edu.

²⁴² “The Popular Discourses of Salafi Radicalism and Salafi Counter-Radicalism in Nigeria,” 126.

²⁴³ National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, “Global Terrorism Database,” accessed April 4, 2015, <http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/>.

²⁴⁴ United States Institute Of Peace, *Why Do Youth Join Boko Haram?*, 5.

office in Abuja and a July 2012 attack on the Sokoto State police headquarters.²⁴⁵

However, Boko Haram has successfully employed individual suicide bombers frequently on a wide range of targets throughout Nigeria that include churches, police stations, police convoys, government buildings, and crowded markets.²⁴⁶ It is likely that vehicle borne devices have not been used as much because individuals with a bomb in a backpack have greater access to crowded places and the ability to sneak through security checkpoints.

Within their ideology, and declared war on Christians, it can be expected that a preponderance of Boko Haram attacks would be directed at churches and locations in Nigeria heavily populated with non-Muslims. In 2012, Boko Haram attacked a church on average once per month.²⁴⁷ As an added benefit to their attacks on Christian targets, Christian militias have been established in Jos, Plateau State, who are increasingly hostile to Muslims.²⁴⁸ Plateau State is located in the central part of Nigeria, between the Muslim North and the Christian South. As violence begets violence within Central Nigeria, it will increasingly lead to genocidal tendencies that further expose the rifts in Nigeria, forcing Muslims to look to Boko Haram for security.

Also, as Boko Haram's name implies that Western education is forbidden, it would be expected that a number of Boko Haram attacks would target education

²⁴⁵ Zenn, *Northern Nigeria's Boko Haram*, 44.

²⁴⁶ N. I. O. and D. L-B. [pseud.], 27-30.

²⁴⁷ Ibid.

²⁴⁸ Perry, 38.

institutions. In 2012, Boko Haram conducted forty-seven attacks on schools; in 2013 the number of attacks decreased to only fourteen, but the number of people killed in each attack almost doubled.²⁴⁹ As mentioned previously, Boko Haram’s 2013 attack on a dormitory in Yobe State, which resulted in the death of seventy sleeping students, was condemned by one of AQIM’s spiritual leaders.²⁵⁰ While attacking education facilities, and kidnapping over 250 schoolgirls, fits within Mohammed Yusuf’s original Boko Haram doctrine, Yusuf’s Boko Haram offered Islamic school alternatives. Based on this evidence, Boko Haram under Shekau does not offer any forms of Islamic education or schools, except those that will ensure Boko Haram fighters are willing to become martyrs.

As can be seen below in figure 3, the locations of attacks contributed to Boko Haram since 2013, collected from the Global Terrorism Database, has been graphically portrayed on a map of Nigeria. Based on this analysis, Boko Haram violence has been centered on Borno and Yobe States in Northeast Nigeria, as well as the villages along the main highways leading into those states.

Since the 2013 state of emergency in these states, Boko Haram has been increasingly willing to attack Muslims. In the January 2014 attack on Kuwari village in Borno State, Boko Haram assaulted the town in armored personnel carriers and gun trucks captured from Nigerian security forces, killing eighty-five Muslims, burning seven

²⁴⁹ National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, *Boko Haram: Background Report*, 4.

²⁵⁰ Zenn, “Nigerian Al-Qaedaism,” 111.

mosques, and 300 houses.²⁵¹ As Boko Haram attempts to reclaim Maiduguri, the capital of Borno State and their former home under Yusuf, more innocent Muslims will be forced to join Boko Haram, flee, or die.²⁵² If Boko Haram continues down the path of targeting Muslims, it can be expected that they will reduce covert support from, and the willingness of, moderate Muslim power-brokers in Nigeria who might have overlooked Boko Haram's attacks on the Nigerian Government and Christians.

Additionally, as depicted below in figure 3, Northwest Nigeria has been spared from Boko Haram violence. The lack of Boko Haram attacks west of Kaduna and Kano states may indicate that Boko Haram does not have the required power and influence amongst the majority Muslim populations of Northwest Nigerian States. Similarly, the lack of attacks south of Plateau State, or anywhere else in Southern Nigeria, may indicate that Boko Haram currently lacks operational reach. Instead, their tactical efforts are centered around Northeast Nigeria.

²⁵¹ Azeez Olaniyan and Lucky Asuelime, "Boko Haram Insurgency and the Widening of Cleavages in Nigeria," *Africa Security* 7, no. 2 (May 2014): 92, accessed March 19, 2015, <http://www.tandfonline.com/>.

²⁵² The Soufan Group, *The TSG IntelBrief: Boko Haram Takes, Holds Territory*.



Figure 3. Boko Haram Attacks January 2013–January 2015

Source: Lib.utexas.edu, “Nigeria Maps,” Perry-Castañeda Map Collection, University of Texas Library Online, accessed March 25, 2015, <http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/nigeria.html>; National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, “Global Terrorism Database,” accessed April 4, 2015, <http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/>.

Lessons Learned from the Boko Haram Case Study

Boko Haram’s strategy changed significantly following the death of its former leader Mohammed Yusuf in July 2009. Yusuf was a charismatic leader who had developed personal relationships with affluent Muslims in Northern Nigeria. Through these relationships, multiple Northern Nigerian State Governors not only overlooked the bellicose Salafist rhetoric of Yusuf, but also provided significant financial donations.

Financial donations provided to Boko Haram, allowed Yusuf to create a state within the state for his followers, which offered social services not provided by the Nigerian Government. Under Yusuf, Boko Haram was on a course that would fulfill their desired end state, creation of an Islamic state in Northern Nigeria.

Boko Haram is a youth oriented organization. Sixty-two percent of the Nigerian population is under the age of 25.²⁵³ Similarly, the average age of Boko Haram militants is thirty. A large number of uneducated and unemployed young Nigerians likely provides fertile ground for Boko Haram recruitment. By having a youth oriented recruiting base, Boko Haram provides a way for disaffected Muslim Nigerian youth to air their grievances through violence. Young Nigerians are unlikely true believers of Boko Haram's Salafist doctrine; instead, Boko Haram may be attractive to young Nigerians because it offers a possible escape from poverty and unemployment. Similarly, young men of any culture are often drawn to organizations that provide camaraderie and a sense of purpose.

Religion and history legitimate Boko Haram's identity and violence. Boko Haram's extreme violence is legitimized through their adherence to a puritanical Salafist narrative. Similarly, Boko Haram leverages a collective memory amongst Northern Nigerian Muslims that it was common practice for the Sokoto Caliphate to enslave and claim the property of non-Muslims. Through extreme acts of violence, Boko Haram supports their religious, historical, and cultural narrative.

²⁵³ Central Intelligence Agency, "Nigeria."

Boko Haram is increasingly reliant on illicit sources of income. Boko Haram has historically received donations through traditional zakat. They also fund their operations through crime, demanding protection fees, and kidnap-for-ransom operations. The increased number of Boko Haram's kidnap-for-ransom operations may indicate that Boko Haram financial requirements have exceeded their legitimate sources of income. As Boko Haram membership and territory expands, so will the need for additional finances, which are likely to be pursued through criminal acts.

Boko Haram satisfies weapons and ammunition requirements unfulfilled by the black market through captured Nigerian security forces equipment. Through their attacks on security forces, Boko Haram has gained access to armored personnel carriers, technical vehicles, machine guns, and ammunition. As Boko Haram membership and territory expands, so will their requirement to acquire more weapons. If the black market network is unable to support their demand, Boko Haram will increasingly attack Nigerian security force outposts.

Boko Haram receives limited popular support. The majority of Boko Haram attacks since 2013 have targeted Muslims in Borno and Yobe States. In sharp contrast, there have been limited Boko Haram attacks elsewhere in Nigeria. Boko Haram is currently coercing popular support through terrorism as they attempt to expand their power and influence. As Boko Haram gains increased popular support in Northeast Nigeria, it is likely they will increase their operational reach into other regions within Nigeria.

Boko Haram receives limited external support. Boko Haram does have external support from trans-national terrorist organizations, like ISIL and AQIM. These

organizations have recognized Boko Haram, but are unlikely to send large contingents of militants to fight alongside Boko Haram in Nigeria. However, this recognition does provide Boko Haram legitimacy as an Islamic revolution. It is also likely that these organizations provide Boko Haram with financial support and tactical military expertise. While members of ISIL and AQIM may not surge into Nigeria, it is likely Boko Haram members have an open invitation to travel to Mali, Somalia, Iraq, or the Levant to train with and learn from these external allies.

Boko Haram's terrorism and propaganda are focused on a regional audience. Boko Haram's use of online videos only began in 2010; prior to 2010 they did not use the internet for propaganda. It is likely that Boko Haram's use of online videos to spread propaganda was adopted after observing the effectiveness of such methods as used by other terrorist organizations. Any organization willing to behead prisoners in a video posted online would induce a hyperbolic response from opponents. The similarities between Boko Haram videos and those of ISIL also serve to reinforce images that Boko Haram is part of a larger Islamic network, which again provides legitimacy. However, in contrast to Shekau's threats to wage a war against the Nigerian Government contained in the videos posted online, since 2013 Boko Haram has not conducted any attacks in the Nigerian Capital of Abuja.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND FINDINGS

In chapter 4, Boko Haram was compared to a case study of the successful Algerian National Liberation Front's (FLN) insurgency using what was assessed to be the key factors for evaluating an insurgency:

1. How did the insurgents establish and leverage popular support?
2. How did the insurgents establish and leverage external support?
3. How did the insurgents develop unity?
4. How and why was propaganda and terrorism used, and who was the target?

By comparing Boko Haram to a successful insurgency, the FLN, it was possible to answer the primary research question. Maintaining their current strategy, Boko Haram can successfully usurp the Nigerian Government's control over Northern Nigeria; however, it will take decades and will only occur as a direct result of the Nigerian Government's lack of commitment to defeating Boko Haram.

By 1960, after six years of guerilla warfare, the Algerian National Liberation Army (ALN) was almost defeated by the French military's COIN forces within Algeria. The FLN's quest to usurp French control of Algeria was not won by guerilla warfare alone; instead, the FLN's ability to leverage diplomatic support and recognition within the international arena led the French Government to grant Algeria independence.

Differing from the Algerian case study, Boko Haram's guerilla campaign since 2010 is expanding. Yet Boko Haram does not have the popular, nor external support that the FLN was able to generate. If the Nigerian military adopts the French military's COIN tactics, it is likely that Boko Haram's insurgency will be forced into hiding again. Similar to their

situation in 2009 after the Nigerian security forces campaign that resulted in the death of their former leader Mohammed Yusuf.

To achieve their end state, Boko Haram must establish authority and power over the population and territory in Northern Nigeria, so much that the Nigerian Government concedes control of the region to Boko Haram. The ways insurgents establish legitimate authority and power in a region are religion, violence, and identity management.²⁵⁴ Boko Haram, like the FLN, has leveraged the Islamic religion to gather support, recruit fighters, and legitimize their use of violence. Where Boko Haram and the FLN differ is in the application of Islam within their strategies.

Puritanical Salafist ideology is at the center of Boko Haram's identity and narrative. The fact that the Algerian insurgents were Muslims was a fortunate coincidence; instead, at the center of the FLN was a secular nationalist ideology. The FLN did not proclaim a desire to establish an Islamic state or Algerian Caliphate. By maintaining a nationalist identity and a corresponding narrative that Algerian insurgents were fighting to remedy the injustices of colonial rule, the FLN was able to garner greater support. Had the FLN, like Boko Haram, espoused the desire to create an Islamic state under a puritanical interpretation of Islam, they may have disenfranchised moderate Muslims within Algeria and external support from moderate Muslim governments, such as Egypt's Gamel Abd Al Nasser. Similarly, many of the FLN leadership were former members of communist parties. Had the FLN retained a communist agenda it would have been condemned by US and Western European governments.

²⁵⁴ Anne L. Clunan and Harold A. Trinkunas, *Ungoverned Spaces* (Stanford, CA: Stanford Security Studies, 2010), 145.

Within the current international environment, and its narrative, Boko Haram cannot gain the external support to win their fight for legitimacy at the UN as the FLN did. Instead, their success will be dependent on popular support within Nigeria. By establishing and leveraging popular support, an insurgency has the capacity to build a “fortress without walls,” where the local populace is isolated from the incumbent government’s influence.²⁵⁵ The ALN was able to establish pockets of resistance amongst rural villages and the crowded urban kasbahs. Like the ALN, Boko Haram has established control over several rural villages in Northeast Nigeria, as well as pockets of resistance in larger Northeast Nigerian cities.

Both the Algerians and Boko Haram leveraged a narrative that they were fighting injustice, corruption, and economic inequalities, to gather popular support. Through popular support insurgents are able to generate the resources needed to expand their influence. Similar to Metcalfe’s Law, the popularity or value of an insurgent organization increases proportionately with each new member that joins the insurgent network.²⁵⁶ Thus, Boko Haram must continually expand its membership to survive.

During the early years of Boko Haram under Mohammed Yusuf, 2003 to 2009, the narrative of fighting the Nigerian Government’s injustice and corruption was enough to attract recruits. Since Abubakar Shekau took control of Boko Haram in 2010, Boko Haram has increasingly had to force recruitment through kidnappings and threats of violence. Similarly, during the initial phases of the Algerian War, the ALN forced

²⁵⁵ Clunan and Trinkunas, 95.

²⁵⁶ “Metcalfe’s Law,” accessed April 12, 2015, <http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/Metcalfe-s-Law.html>.

recruitment through violence, but by the second year of the war, as the insurgency survived initial defeat and gained legitimacy, the ALN had more recruits than they could manage. Boko Haram's requirement to expand their membership through forced recruitment is an indicator that they lack legitimacy.

The Boko Haram insurgency is stuck in the survival phase of guerilla warfare, which makes their power and authority transient in nature. Like the ALN, the longer Boko Haram is able to survive defeat, the more legitimate they will become. Currently, when the Nigerian military conducts security operations in towns and villages Boko Haram guerillas hide in caves to avoid capture, rather than standing and fighting.²⁵⁷ Until Boko Haram can legitimize their power and authority amongst Northern Nigerians they will be unable to generate the popular support necessary to achieve their desired end state.

The ALN conducted decentralized operations during the first two years of the Algerian War, but the insurgents lacked unity of effort and failed to achieve lasting effects. After the Soummam Congress, the ALN organized into a standardized structure, a rank system was developed, and a centralized committee for coordination and execution was established. While conducting decentralized operations, the ALN was able to evade French military patrols, but was unable to generate lasting effects. Boko Haram, like the early ALN, are operating in decentralized organizational structures, which allows them to avoid destruction by Nigerian military patrols. Even though Shekau appears in propaganda videos as the central face of Boko Haram, his death would not significantly

²⁵⁷ BBC News, "Rare Video Shows Boko Haram Attack," (Video), posted March 31, 2014, accessed March 19, 2015, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jiaFQB6t5tE>.

disrupt Boko Haram's future existence. Similarly, the disassembly or capture of an individual Boko Haram cell would not significantly affect the entire organization.

Through decentralized operations and organizational structures, Boko Haram is able to avoid defeat. If Boko Haram's desired end state is to create their own Islamic caliphate in Northern Nigeria, they cannot simply avoid defeat, they have to seize and retain territory. If Boko Haram members are unable or unwilling to defend villages and towns that they have captured, they will not achieve the level of legitimacy required to create their Islamic state.

In their online videos, Boko Haram attempts to establish their legitimacy as an insurgency. In the absence of the internet and video, the ALN was able to establish their legitimacy by expanding their presence throughout Algerian towns and villages. Both forms of propaganda promote the assumption that the incumbent government's security forces are unable to stop the insurgency. While it is difficult to assess whether Boko Haram's videos has had any effect on their recruitment, ALN presence in villages directly increased many local Algerians desire to support the ALN.

Boko Haram is still expanding. Currently their influence is limited to Northeast Nigeria and areas of neighboring Cameroon and Chad. To achieve their desired end state, Boko Haram must expand its influence into the Muslim states of Northwest Nigeria. Boko Haram has yet to reach the tipping point where Northern Nigerian Muslims perceive Boko Haram as a legitimate alternative to the Nigerian Government. Under its current decentralized organizational structure, it is unlikely that Boko Haram will have the capacity to exert the power necessary to isolate the population under its control from the Nigerian Government's influence.

Both the ALN and Boko Haram have leveraged xenophobia between Christians and Muslims to increase popular support for their cause. If Boko Haram is unable to provide an alternative to the Nigerian Government, necessary to achieve and maintain popular support, the group could instead focus its efforts on destabilizing the security situation in Northern Nigeria. Boko Haram attacks on Christians have resulted in Christian militias forming to seek vengeance on Muslims, even those without connections to Boko Haram. By propagating xenophobia between Christians and Muslims, and exposing the Nigerian Government's inability to protect Muslims, Boko Haram increases its own legitimacy amongst the Muslim community. Boko Haram is already creating this artificial security dilemma through their current strategy; however, to gather additional support from Nigeria's Muslim population, Boko Haram would need to focus explicitly on this effort.

What Boko Haram could do to Improve their Strategy

The following findings were identified through the case study comparison between the ongoing Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria and the FLN's successful insurgency in Algeria. Through these findings the researcher is not offering predictions of what Boko Haram will do in the future; instead, based on a comparison to a successful insurgency, they were designed to highlight what Boko Haram could do to improve their insurgent strategy and thus assist Nigerian Government efforts to defeat this threat.

Boko Haram can increase their attacks on Nigerian security force facilities. Through attacks on Nigerian security force facilities, Boko Haram legitimizes their narrative and increases their levels of popular and external support. Successful attacks on Nigerian security forces offer two distinct advantages to Boko Haram. First, they are able

to resupply their fighters with confiscated heavy weapons and ammunition, unlikely available on the black market. Second, when Boko Haram is able to defeat Nigerian security forces it shifts the perception of power in favor of Boko Haram and away from the Nigerian Government. Nigerian security personnel are legitimate targets for Boko Haram.

Boko Haram can increase attacks on Christian targets. Attacks on Christian targets has been beneficial to Boko Haram. After recent Boko Haram church bombings, Christian militia groups have formed and responded by conducting retaliatory attacks on Muslims in Jos, Plateau State. As attacks by Christian militias on Muslims increase, the Nigerian security forces will be forced to respond. If the Nigerian security forces are unable to protect the Muslim population from Christian militias, Boko Haram can fill the security vacuum and further legitimize its position amongst Nigerian Muslims. Again, attacks on Christian targets fits within their puritanical, Salafist identity; therefore, not only is a church a legitimate target, but so are Christian schools. Additionally, just as a matter of targeting prioritization, the assassination of Christian religious officials would have a more significant impact and is likely to increase the level of retaliation from Christian militias.

Boko Haram can stop forced recruitment and adjust their narrative. Forced recruitment is an indicator that Boko Haram lacks popular support. Given Nigeria's youth bulge, there should be more than enough disaffected young men and women willing to join Boko Haram. Additionally, forced recruitment will further damage Boko Haram's legitimacy and degrade popular support. Boko Haram will be unable to transition to a source of legitimate authority, which is necessary if the organization intends to create an

Islamic state in Northern Nigeria. Boko Haram's current hyperbolic narrative and corresponding actions, giving Muslim villagers only the options of join Boko Haram or die, is counter-productive.

Boko Haram could expand their influence amongst Muslims throughout Nigeria. As discovered in a graphical analysis of Boko Haram attacks since 2013, depicted in figure 3 in chapter 4, Boko Haram attacks are primarily limited to Northeast Nigeria. The ALN divided the entire country of Algeria into six sectors of operation. By diffusing into six sectors, the ALN was able to prevent the superior French COIN forces from massing their capabilities on any one area and defeating the insurgents. Boko Haram's decentralized structure is limited only to Northeast Nigeria. Anytime Boko Haram attempts to mass forces in Northeast Nigeria the Nigeria security forces will likely overwhelm and destroy the Boko Haram elements. A concentration of Boko Haram activities and forces in Northeast Nigeria ensures that Boko Haram's ability to exert influence over the Muslim population of Northeast Nigeria will only be transient and fleeting.

Boko Haram could adjust their narrative. Under their current identity as a Salafist Nigerian insurgency, Boko Haram has focused their attacks on anyone or anything that does not support Boko Haram. Within this narrative, Boko Haram has justified attacks on Nigeria Muslims and mosques. As a result, Boko Haram is stuck in a cycle of violence that will prevent the group from establishing the requisite power and influence needed to control territory. If Boko Haram is going to be successful at creating an Islamic state in Nigeria they require increased popular support. Their current hyperbolic narrative ensures that they will not attain the level of popular support needed to create their Islamic state.

Boko Haram could remove Abubakar Shekau as their leader. Shekau is not the charismatic leader that Mohammed Yusuf was. Based on the examination of Boko Haram's videos featuring Shekau, he does not have the presence or competence to lead a successful insurgency. While he might appeal to a young Nigerian audience, Boko Haram's recruiting base of young Northern Nigerian Muslims likely lack access to the internet. Shekau's wildly dramatic militant messages and threats in online videos are unlikely to resonate with affluent Northern Nigerian Muslim. Boko Haram will not achieve their desired end state unless they are able to find a leader, or spokesperson, that can engender support and influence amongst Northern Nigerian Muslim power brokers.

Final Thoughts and Recommendations

Recommendations for Future Research

This study focused explicitly on Boko Haram's insurgent strategy. With the insights gained through the deconstruction of Boko Haram's strategy, a future examination of the Nigerian Government's COIN strategy would provide a complete picture of the likely future of this conflict. Similarly, a comparison between Boko Haram and Hezbollah would provide additional insights into Boko Haram's strategic options. Additionally, during this study it was discovered that Boko Haram attacks since January 2013 have avoided Northwest Nigeria. It was recommended that Boko Haram could improve their strategy by expanding their operations into the Northwest. Further research is required to understand why they have not. Northwest Nigeria was the historical seat of the early Sokoto Caliphate. If Boko Haram's lack of expansion into the majority Muslim Northwest has to do with a lack of legitimacy there, it may provide the key to defeating Boko Haram.

Recommendations for Improving the Nigerian Government's COIN Strategy

Through the isolation of possible alternatives or course corrections for Boko Haram's strategy, it was possible to identify opportunities for inclusion in the Nigerian Government's COIN strategy. First, the use of excessive force by Nigerian security forces on the civilian population of Northeast Nigeria will increase popular support for Boko Haram. Second, all Nigerian security force facilities should be better protected and have a dedicated quick reaction force on call to help repel a possible Boko Haram attack. Third, Boko Haram will be unable to expand its influence into the Muslim population of Northwest Nigeria while they are fighting to maintain their influence in Borno and Yobe States. The focus of Nigeria security force operations should be in those states. Finally, Boko Haram requires the legitimacy of Salafist ideology, without it their campaign of terror loses its purpose. The Nigerian Government should reach out to Salafist clerics that can offer a counter-propaganda message that shows Boko Haram's interpretation of Salafist teaching to be wrong.

Developments in Nigeria Since the End of Data Collection

Since the completion of data collection, two significant events have occurred in Nigeria that will likely alter the future of Boko Haram: Nigeria elected a Sunni Muslim President and Boko Haram rebranded as the Islamic State's West Africa Province. In 2015 national elections, Nigeria elected a Northern Nigerian Muslim, Muhammadu Buhari. Since the election, President-elect Buhari has stated that his first two concerns will be fighting corruption and working with the governments of neighboring Chad,

Cameroon, and Niger to defeat Boko Haram.²⁵⁸ President-elect Buhari has been in the foreground of Nigerian national politics since the late 1970s. Buhari, then a General in the Nigerian Army, was selected to be the Nigerian head of state following a military coup in 1983.²⁵⁹ Much like his present attention to stamping out corruption, in 1983 General Buhari made a similar commitment. While his campaign was aggressive, it failed to alleviate the poor economic conditions in Nigeria and within two years, he was removed from power and imprisoned.²⁶⁰

President-elect Buhari likely has influential relationships with Muslim power brokers throughout Nigeria and West Africa. Based on their Salafist ideology, Boko Haram will likely label President Buhari as a false Muslim in order to delegitimize his authority and make him a target for attack. However, if President Buhari's government is able to expand its popular support amongst Northeast Nigerian Muslims it will threaten Boko Haram. It can be expected that a reduction in popular support amongst Northeast Nigerian Muslims will cause Boko Haram to escalate their current levels of violence. As Boko Haram's influence wanes, its members will increasingly resort to terrorism to coerce support.

²⁵⁸ Christian Purfoy and Holly Yan, "Nigeria's President-Elect Muhammadu Buhari Says He Will Fight Corruption," posted April 1, 2015, accessed April 27, 2015, <http://www.cnn.com/2015/04/01/africa/nigeria-presidential-election/>.

²⁵⁹ Encyclopedia Britannica, s.v. "Muhammadu Buhari: Head of State of Nigeria," accessed April 27, 2015, <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/83801/Muhammadu-Buhari>.

²⁶⁰ Ibid.

Following a March 2015 audio recording, which contained Abubakar Shekau pledging allegiance to ISIL, as of late April 2015 Boko Haram appears to have rebranded themselves as the Islamic State's West Africa Province (ISWAP).²⁶¹ It would seem that through this change Boko Haram has achieved their desired end state, creating an Islamic state in Nigeria, at least in spirit. However, based on the primary research question, Boko Haram's existence and ability to continue a campaign of violence is not enough to usurp the Nigerian Government's control over Northern Nigeria.

Since Boko Haram's inception, the organization has sought external patronage from transnational terrorist organizations. First, it was the core Al Qaeda leadership, then it was AQIM, and now it is ISIL. It is the researcher's opinion that Boko Haram's strategy regressed following the death of Mohammed Yusuf in 2009 and has since been stuck in the proto-insurgent phase, grasping for an ideology that will result in measurable success.

ISIL needs Boko Haram more than Boko Haram needs ISIL. ISIL needs proof that their renewed Caliphate has influence and appeal beyond the borders of Iraq and the Levant. With each new regional Islamic militia that joins ISIL, this organization increases in power and influence globally. As previously mentioned, Boko Haram's pattern of seeking out external recognition logically led to an allegiance with ISIL. Boko Haram may derive value from this relationship since it is likely that ISIL: provides Boko Haram with financial support, will help improve their social media presence, and legitimizes

²⁶¹ Frances Martel, "Islamic State in Africa: Boko Haram Rebrands," posted April 27, 2015, accessed April 27, 2015, <http://www.breitbart.com/national-security/2015/04/27/islamic-state-in-west-africa-boko-haram-rebrands/>.

their campaign of indiscriminate violence. It has yet to be seen whether ISIL's patronage to regional surrogates will be as effective as Iran's support for Hezbollah.

It is also still debated whether Abubakar Shekau approved of the rebranding of Boko Haram as ISWAP.²⁶² The decision to join ISIL likely appeals to Boko Haram's recruiting base of young, impoverished, uneducated, and disaffected Nigerians; however, it is unlikely to improve popular support for Boko Haram amongst Northeast Nigerian Muslims. Similarly, it is possible that the decision to rebrand as an official member of ISIL will create disunity within the insurgent organization. Additionally, the declaration is likely to put Boko Haram at odds with elements of AQIM that remain loyal to core Al Qaeda. Furthermore, while the rebranding will likely renew international attention, it will also invoke additional international support for the Nigerian Government's COIN campaign.

It will have limited impact on the new Boko Haram brand, ISWAP, if ISIL is defeated militarily in Iraq. As long as there are disaffected youths in Nigeria, militant Islamic ideologies will still resonate and foster Boko Haram like organizations. Radicalized militants seem to be a symptom of the New World Order, which is no longer strictly attributed to failed governance anymore. This research has shown that Boko Haram's strategy, even as a rebranded member of an ISIL, will only usurp the Nigerian Government's control over Northern Nigeria due to the Nigerian Government's lack of commitment to defeating this threat.

²⁶² Frances Martel, "Islamic State in Africa: Boko Haram Rebrands," April 27, 2015, accessed April 27, 2015, <http://www.breitbart.com/national-security/2015/04/27/islamic-state-in-west-africa-boko-haram-rebrands/>.

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